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I. INTRODUCTION
Regional fluctuations in enlistments have been a feature of the Army
recruiting landscape since the beginning of the all-volunteer era. These
fluctuations, caused principally by economic and demographic changes, have
triggered frequent shifts in recruiting policies. For the Active Components,
the geographic distribution of recruiters and the assignment of mission to
recruiters are examples of policies that are based on each region's potential as
a source of new recruits. For the Reserve Components, geographic differences
in market potential are even more important for recruiting success:
Recruiting activities by necessity are confined to areas in which Troop
Program Units (TPUs) are located. Unlike the Active Army, however, Reserve
recruiters cannot be shifted from market to market in response to changes in
economic or demographic conditions. Persistent shortfalls can be solved only
by more drastic policies of relocating existing Reserve TPUs away from areas
with poor market potential or by assigning increased authorizations to units
in areas with high market potential.
Manpower supply models have long been used to analyze regional factors
that affect enlistment levels, and have been used to forecast future enlist-
ments on the basis of projected changes in those factors. Such forecasts allow
the Recruiting Command to anticipate shifts in markets that might cause
potential recruiting shortfalls and to implement policies to counter such
shifts. These models normally include measures of regional economic condi-
tions, such as unemployment and civilian youth wages, and demographic
conditions, such as the population of recruitable youth. Recent models have
attempted to incorporate measures of regional "propensity" in an effort to
capture the underlying attitude toward military service within a region. 1
The strength of manpower supply models rests on their ability to fore-
cast the short-term environment. They are most accurate in making short-
term forecasts because regional unemployment and wage projections are
reliable only in the near-term. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of such
models can be safely assumed to remain fixed only for a short period in the
xSee Kearl, et al. (1990). On-going research at USAREC is also attempting to estimate the
proportion of a region's youth population that is mentally qualified for military service, and
to forecast these figures into the 21st century.
future. Thus, econometric supply models cannot be used to make reliable mid-
to long-term enlistment forecasts.
The purpose of this report is to evaluate trends in regional recruiting
markets for the 1990s and into the 21st century. The report attempts to iden-
tify important regional population trends, analyze their causes, and project
future directions. The paper focuses on several key factors that influence
population changes: Economic and employment conditions; migration pat-
terns; and immigration. Changes in economic factors affect labor market
conditions in a region, and thereby indirectly affect recruiting potential. By
changing the quantity and quality of the recruitable population, migration
and immigration affect recruiting directly; by influencing wage and employ-
ment levels in regional youth labor markets, migration and immigration also
affect recruiting indirectly.
During the 1970s an unprecedented shift occurred in the regional distri-
bution of U.S. population. Between 1970 and 1980 the nation's population
grew from 203.3 to 226.5 million, or by 23.2 million persons. As Table 1
shows, of these incremental residents 20.9 million, or 90 percent, accrued to
the South and West Census regions. The previous historical high percentage
of incremental national population accounted for by the South and West was
65 percent during the 1930s. During the 1960s these regions accounted for
only 61 percent of incremental national population.
The first half of the 1980s saw a continuation and even a slight accelera-
tion of the regional population shift. The nation's population is estimated to
have grown by 12.2 million during the 1980-85 period with over 91 percent of
the incremental residents accruing to the South and West Census regions. 2
However, during the latter half of the 1980s the shift began to slow, as indi-
cated by the fact that during the entire decade the South and West accounted
for 87.7 percent of the nation's incremental population of 23.1 million persons
(Table 1). Although dramatic regional shifts of population and employment
have been occurring for some time and appear to be well-established, a major
theme of this paper is that they are not likely to continue in the future at a
pace that rivals that of the 1970s and 1980s.
2U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986), Table No. 27.
TABLE 1 . POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CENSUS REGIONS,
1979 AND 1980 (thousands)
Change Change
Region 1990 1980 1970 1980-1990 1970-1980
United States 249,633 226,546 203,302 23,087 23,244
Northeast 50,961 49,135 49,061 1,826 75
Midwest 59,878 58,866 56,590 1,012 2,275
South 85,833 75,372 62,812 10,461 12,559
West 52,961 43,172 34,838 9,789 8,334
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abtract of the United States: 7357(1 07th
edition). Washington, DC, 1986, Table No. 24, for 1970 and 1980 data. Data for 1990
are preliminary.
Regional economic and demographic change obviously occur within a
national system, and many forces that are national in scope (not to speak of
those that are international) clearly influence patterns of regional change.
Moreover, trends in interregional population growth and migration tend to be
long-term in nature. Thus, some knowledge of historical patterns is necessary
as a benchmark to identify current trends and as a base from which to
forecast future directions.
The paper begins with a brief discussion of some important national
forces that have influenced regional change since about 1970. Broad patterns
of regional employment and population change are described, with special
emphasis on the behavior of key variables during the 1970-1985 period rela-
tive to the 1950-1970 period. In distinguishing the period from about 1970,
particular attention is paid to inter-regional migration patterns. These pat-
terns are related to the maturing of the baby boom through highly mobile age
classes, which was a national phenomenon of considerable importance.
A second type of national migration pattern that is of great and increas-
ing importance is immigration. Immigration affects total population levels, as
well as the regional and age distribution of the population. The paper treats
immigration in some detail, with an emphasis on the regional distribution of
both the existing stock of immigrants as well as new immigrants.
The paper also details shifts in Army regional recruiting patterns, with-
in the context of regional population and migration shifts. It should be
pointed out that boundaries of the five Army Recruiting Brigades are similar,
but not identical, to the four major census regions. Thus, many of the
observations and conclusions made with respect to changes in census regions
will also apply directly to Brigades (Defense Manpower Data Center, 1991).
Various economic and demographic trends that promise to contribute to a
moderating of regional discrepancies in rates of employment and population
growth are also reviewed. Finally, forecasts of future regional population,
migration, employment, and economic growth are presented and analyzed
with respect to their implications for Army recruiting over the next decades.
It is important to emphasize that the ebb and flow of regional population
and economic activity affect both the Active and Reserve Components, with
perhaps the greater direct effect on recruiting for the Reserves and the main-
tenance of Reserve unit fill rates. For example, the collapse of the Northeast
region as a recruiting market during much of the 1980s affected both compo-
nents, but the Reserves more so than the Active Army because of the fixed
manpower requirements associated with the immobile Reserve units located
in that region. A second point is that many regional changes, especially those
associated with demographic shifts, can be anticipated well in advance of
their occurrence. One objective of this paper is to profile trends in the regional
distribution of population and economic activity that will affect future recruit-
ing. An understanding of the direction and magnitude of regional demo-
graphic and economic trends is necessary so that National recruitment
strategies may be devised.
II. NATIONAL FORCES AFFECTING THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
POPULATION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
The emergence of several broad national forces during the 1970s had
important implications for the spatial distribution of economic activity and
population in the United States. Compared to the 1960s, during the 1970s
national labor supply grew rapidly, both relatively and absolutely, as young
people and women entered the labor force. Several national economic events
also characterized the 1970s, such as the energy crisis early in the period, a
deep recession during 1974—75, and inflation and severe international compe-
tition through much of the decade. Partially as a cause and partially as a con-
sequence of these events, the industrial composition of employment changed
sharply away from manufacturing and toward service activities.
During the seventies national labor supply grew at an annualized rate of
2.5 percent, whereas during the 1960s labor supply grew at an annualized
rate of 1.7 percent. The annualized rate of growth during the 1970s was more
than twice that of 1950s and almost 44 percent higher than that of the 1960s.
Better than 10 million more labor force members were absorbed into the U.S.
labor market during the 1970s than during the 1960s. Three immediate
causes underlie the substantial labor force increase of the seventies: (1) The
aging of the baby-boom cohort into the labor force, which began during the
mid 1960s and continued through the 1970s; (2) Female labor force partici-
pation rates, which increased considerably during the 1960s, increased even
more substantially during the 1970s; and (3) Legal immigration, which con-
sists of relatively many young adults, approached all time historic high levels
during the 1970s and 1980s, and due to economic conditions in Mexico and
the Caribbean, illegal immigration probably increased substantially also.
The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 was a severe shock to the economy
at the very time it was undergoing continued dislocations and reallocations
brought on by post-Vietnam adjustments. Moreover, the recession of 1974—75
was then the most severe of the post-World War II period, and the national
unemployment rate soared from 5.0 percent to 9.2 percent in one year. Seri-
ous inflation accompanied high unemployment rates. Furthermore, foreign
competition, especially in steel and automobiles, had important implications
for the national economy, as well as for various regional economies. The
recession of the early 1980s was even more severe than that of the mid 1970s
and particularly affected the Midwest region.
The industrial composition of U.S. employment has been changing for
some time, but the 1970s brought dramatic new elements to this change.
Employment in the manufacturing sector was almost stagnant during the
decade, and the rate of growth of government employment fell sharply. On
the other hand, due primarily to the energy crisis, during the 1970s the min-
ing sector reversed a long-term downward trend and grew more rapidly than
any other sector, which contributed to a resurgence of nonmetropolitan Amer-
ica. During the 1980s the fortunes of the mining sector again turned down-
ward, especially but not limited to oil and gas exploration and extraction.
Interstate and intra-county rates of mobility also declined somewhat during
the 1970s, especially among young people. One of the most important causes
of decreased rates of movement was probably the continued fall in marriage
rates of the young. Among other factors, a desire on the part of women, at
least relative to their mothers, to decrease the number of children they bear
and to postpone fertility has probably caused the marriage rate to fall. These
desires are likely to be tied to increased female labor force participation and
labor force attachment.
III. INTERREGIONAL SHIFTS IN THE LOCATION OF
EMPLOYMENT AND POPULATION
Since approximately 1970, trends in the spatial distribution of economic
activity and of population in the United States have changed dramatically. As
Table 2 shows, in 1970, the South and West held about 45 percent of the
nation's nonagricultural employment, but during the 1970s these regions
accounted for almost 73 percent of the nation's incremental employment of
this type. Conversely, the Northeast and Midwest held about 55 percent of
national nonagricultural employment in 1970, but accounted for only 27 per-
cent of incremental national employment. During the early 1980s, moreover,
the Northeast and especially the Midwest experienced sizeable absolute
TABLE 2. ABSOLUTE NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT CHANGE AND
SHARES OF ABSOLUTE NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT












































































































































United States 9,074.9 16,774.2 20,065.7 19,717.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Calculated from data presented in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1985, 1989).
declines in their nonagricultural employment base. The manufacturing sec-
tors of these regions were hit particularly hard by the recessionary conditions
of the early 1980s, but the rising U.S. dollar and increased foreign competi-
tion also hurt. Since manufacturing is heavily concentrated in the metropoli-
tan areas of the Northeast and Midwest, these areas were particularly
touched by national economic conditions.
Data on the location of nonagricultural employment in Table 2 clearly
document the extent of the interregional redistribution ofjobs since 1950. In
certain respects, moreover, the shift out of the Northeast and Midwest
appears to have accelerated after 1970, due in part to the serious effects that
the recession of the early 1980s had in these regions and in part to the fact
that the 1960s was a period of notable prosperity for them.
In the Northeast and Midwest employment grew somewhat less rapidly
during the 1970s than during the 1960s. The Northeast had an annualized
rate of growth during the 1970s (0.9 percent) that was only 50 percent of that
during the 1960s, and the Midwest had a rate (1.7 percent) only about 74 per-
cent as high. During each period the South grew at almost the same rate (3.7
percent in the 1960s and 3.6 percent in the 1970s), whereas the West's rate of
growth increased by 17 percent during the 1970s (to 4.1 percent).
Relative to the South and West, the employment performance of the
Northeast and Midwest deteriorated badly during the 1970s. Let us take the
most rapidly growing region as the benchmark for each period, which during
the 1960s was the South (3.7 percent annualized rate) and during the 1970s
was the West (4.1 percent). The Northeast grew 49 percent as fast as the
South during the 1960s, but only 22 percent as fast as the West during the
1970s. The Midwest grew 62 percent as fast as the South during the 1960s
and 41 percent as fast as the West during the 1970s. During the 1950s the
West was the most rapidly growing region (4.0 percent annualized rate), and
the Northeast grew at about 23 percent of its rate, whereas the Midwest
region grew at 33 percent of this rate. Hence, as far as the Northeast and
Midwest are concerned, the 1960s appears to have been an abnormal period
during which employment grew relatively fast compared to other periods
although still slowly compared to other regions.
Viewed from the perspective of shares of national employment and of
national incremental employment, the performance of the Northeast and
Midwest clearly deteriorated in the 1970s relative to both the 1960s and the
8
1950s. During the 1950s the Northeast experienced a 2.7 percentage point
drop in its share of national employment; during the 1960s the share dropped
by 2.5 percentage points; and during the 1970s it fell by 3.8 percentage
points. The Northeast accounted for only 9.2 percent of incremental national
employment during the 1970s compared to 15.3 percent and 18.2 percent
during the prior two decades, respectively (Table 2). The Middle Atlantic and
East North Central divisions were particularly affected during the seventies.
Qualitatively similar observations apply to the Midwest, which had a 1.8
percentage point drop in its share of national nonagricultural employment in
the 1950s, a 1.1 percentage point drop during the 1960s, and a 2.2 percentage
point drop during the 1970s. Respective shares of national incremental
employment accruing to the Midwest during the three decades are 20.5 per-
cent, 24.5 percent, and 18.3 percent (Table 2).
After the recession of 1981-1982, the remainder of the 1980s experienced
a major prolonged economic expansion. Employment gains, however, were
distributed unevenly across regions. Table 2 shows that a dramatic resurg-
ence in employment occurred in the Northeast during the middle and late
1980s—its share of the change in national nonagricultural employment from
1980 to 1988 was 16.9 percent, almost equal to its share in the 1960s. This
employment growth was fueled by changes in the Middle Atlantic states of
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, which nearly tripled their
employment growth shares. By contrast, the Midwest merely maintained its
relative employment position during the 1980-1988 period. The share of
national incremental employment fell in both the South and West during the
1980s. The largest drop occurred in the West South Central division, with
only the South Atlantic showing a small increase.
Changes in the relative fortunes of each area are attributable to some-
what different factors. In the West South Central and Mountain divisions the
reduction in employment growth was attributable to falling energy prices and
the subsequent drop in the mining industry, especially in oil and gas extrac-
tion. Employment in oil and gas extraction rose to an all-time peak in 1982,
only to drop to an all-time low in 1987. The Middle Atlantic states (especially
New York and New Jersey) benefitted from the buildup in financial services,
transportation services, and retailing. New England benefitted from its
diverse manufacturing base. In Massachusetts, growth occurred in high-
technology durable goods industries, while Rhode Island witnessed a
9
resurgence of traditional, low-wage nondurable goods industries such as
apparel and jewelry. 3
Much of the rhetoric about the relative growth of the "sunbelt" compared
to the "snowbelt" evokes images of mass migration of firms from the North-
east and Midwest to the South and the West. Allaman and Birch (1975) show
that this characterization is not accurate. Net changes in employment within
regions are relatively small, but the changes are accounted for by relatively
large amounts of offsetting activity. Of particular significance is the fact that
interstate migration of firms appears to be of little quantitative importance in
determining employment change. Furthermore, deaths and contractions of
firms appear to be uniform across regions as well as across rapid-growth
compared to slow-growth states. The implication, therefore, is that the birth
of new firms and the expansion of existing firms are responsible for the dif-
ferential rates of employment growth in the South and the West relative to
the Northeast and Midwest.4
The manufacturing sector has for some years had a rate of employment
growth well below the national average growth rate. During the 1970s, how-
ever, the relative performance of manufacturing employment slipped badly
compared to the previous two decades when it grew at an annualized rate
about 53 percent that of total nonagricultural employment; during the 1970s
it grew at only about 19 percent of this overall rate. Since manufacturing
activity has historically been concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest,
these regions were particularly affected by the performance of this sector.
Between 1950 and 1980 the share of national manufacturing employment
3Regional employment patterns are traced in Devens (1988) and Rones (1986).
4Several general hypotheses have been offered to explain the differentially high rates of
births and expansions of firms in the South and West compared to the rest of the United
States. Some have argued that the capital stock in the Northeast and Midwest regions is
older, embodies outdated technology, and is increasingly uncompetitive with newer capital.
However, this phenomenon may be an effect of differential rates of return among regions
rather than a cause. The costs of doing business in the South and West are also argued to be
falling because of improvements in transportation and communications. Most importantly,
population migration accompanying (and partly causing) the regional shift in employment
provides reinforcement by increasing final demands and simultaneously increasing supplies
of labor. Thus, a process of cumulative causation is operating wherein employment growth is
itself responsible for additional employment growth as markets are geographically shifted to
the South and the West.
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accounted for by the Northeast and Midwest fell from 72.1 percent to 54.8
percent.
What particularly distinguishes the 1970s is that manufacturing
employment declined absolutely in the Northeast and Midwest. The decline
amounted to about 529,000 jobs in the Northeast and 193,000 in the Midwest.
During the 1960s, while declining relatively, northeastern and midwestern
manufacturing employment grew by 787,000 jobs, of which 762,000 were in
the latter region. In the South and West this sector grew by almost as much
during the 1970s (1.7 million jobs) as during the 1960s (1.8 million jobs).
The long-term trends in the locus of manufacturing employment have
been attributed to a number of factors. Among those generally regarded as
important are the growth of markets, lack of unionization, relatively low
wages, and climatological amenities in the South and West. The intensifica-
tion of foreign competition during the 1970s, especially in steel and in auto-
mobiles, also had greater effects in certain regions than in others. Whereas
these factors may not favor the South and West as much in the future as they
have in the past, they should continue to be of some importance.
11
IV. REGIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
The simultaneity between population change and employment change is
well-established in the migration literature (Greenwood, 1975). The regional
redistribution of population is expected, therefore, to generally mirror the
employment trends already described. Although a close association is fre-
quently found between employment change and population change, the exact
relationship between these variables is affected by other factors, such as
regional differences in the migrant-attractive power of an incremental job and
the local labor force participation response to employment change. Greenwood
and Hunt (1984) show that the migrant-attractive power of an additional job
is greater in the South and West than in the Northeast and Midwest, with
the difference amounting to about one extra migrant per ten extra jobs.
Moreover, areas with relatively low labor force participation rates have
correspondingly high potential to accommodate employment growth from the
local population. Thus, low participation rates, as reflected in low employ-
ment-to- population ratios, serve as a buffer between employment growth and
migration. This relationship, which appears to have characterized the South
during the 1970s, is described in greater detail later in this paper.
During the 1970s total population growth was largest, in absolute terms,
in the South, followed by the West (Table 1). In percentage terms, however,
the West increased in population by nearly 24 percent from 1970 to 1980,
whereas the South increased by almost 20 percent. Population growth in the
Midwest was only 4.0 percent, and the population of the Northeast remained
nearly constant over the decade. Based on preliminary figures from the 1990
census, the West's population grew by 22.7 percent during the 1980s, followed
by the South at 13.9 percent. The Northeast grew by 3.7 percent and the
Midwest by 1.7 percent (Table 1).
In a definitional sense, two sources of the regional population shift can
usefully be identified—natural increase and migration. Let us consider the
magnitude of each source as they affected regional population change during
the 1970s.
A. NATURAL INCREASE
As shown in Table 3, natural increase accounted for almost 40 percent of
the 20.9 million incremental residents that accrued to the South and West
12
during the 1970s, and over 50 percent during the 1980-88 period. Although
natural increase contributed positively to population growth in each region,
the rate of natural increase was differentially high in the South and West.
This rate exceeded nine percent in the West, was between six and eight per-
cent in the South, between five and six percent in the Midwest, and barely
exceeded three percent in the Northeast (Table 3). Interdivisional differences
in birth rates particularly stand out, with substantial differences existing
between the division with the highest and that with the lowest rate. For
example, in June, 1982, among women 18 to 44 years old, those in the Moun-
tain division had 90.7 births per thousand compared to 60.6 births per thou-
sand for those in the Middle Atlantic division. 5
TABLE 3. COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE BY REGION,
1970-1980 AND 1980-1988 (thousands)
Absolute Natural In- Net-
Change as crease as Migration as
Percent of Percent of Percent of
Absolute Net 1970/1980 1970/1980 1970/1980
Change Births Deaths Migration Population Population Population
1 970-1 980a
Northeast 75 6,661 4,750 -2,888 0.2% 3.9% -5.9%
Midwest 2,275 9,032 5,308 -2,703 4.0 6.6 -4.8
South 12,559 11,221 6,210 5,992 20.0 8.0 9.5
West 8,334 6,330 3,010 4,115 23.9
1980-1988
9.5 11.8
Northeast 1,459 5,712 3,948 -306 2.9% 3.6% -0.6%
Midwest 1,012 7,527 4,355 -2,159 1.7 5.4 -3.7
South 9,283 10,529 5,756 4,511 12.3 6.3 6.0
West 7,506 6,826 2,861 3,540 17.4 9.2 8.2
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053,
"Projections of the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010,"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), Table 5.
aNote that for the 1970-1980 period absolute population change does not equal births minus
deaths plus (negative) net migration. The difference is the "error or closure," or the unexplained
difference between the estimated population at the end of the decade and the census count for
that date.
5U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983), Table B.
13
Several factors help account for the higher rates of natural increase in
the South and West. Religious and ethnic concentrations favor higher birth
rates in many areas of the West and Southwest, and a favorable age structure
of their populations also favors higher birth rates. The Northeast, in particu-
lar, has an older population than the other three regions. In 1980, for exam-
ple, 33.8 percent of the population of the Northeast was 45 years old or older,
while the corresponding percentages were 30.9 percent for the Midwest, 30.4
percent for the South, and 28.6 percent for the West. Correspondingly, the
West has a somewhat higher percentage of its population in the young, child-
bearing years. In the West, 43.3 percent of the 1980 population was between
18 and 44 years of age, compared to 40.9 percent in the South, 40.4 percent in
the Midwest, and 39.6 percent in the Northeast. 6 Insofar as migration is
selective of younger age groups, the future contribution of natural increase to
population growth in the Northeast and Midwest can be expected to deterio-
rate even further relative to the regions receiving substantial numbers of in-
migrants. However, as the baby boom matures out of the ages most commonly
associated with fertility, even the differential rates of natural increase will
probably moderate.
B. INTERNAL MIGRATION
Migration to the South and West has been from two sources—net inter-
nal migration and immigration. Within the U.S. internal migration is a zero-
sum game. Thus, migrants gained by one region must be lost by another.
Table 4 more clearly identifies the direction and magnitude of internal migra-
tion in the United States, including both the reversal of southern net out-
migration and the increased net migration out of the Northeast and Midwest.
Not shown in the table is the fact that prior to the turnaround the South
experienced persistent net out-migration. For example, for 14 of the 16 years
between 1953 and 1968 migration was out of the South. In 8 of these 16 years
this region lost over 200,000 net migrants and in one year alone lost over
400,000. Although the South experienced some net in-migration between
1965 and 1970, the volume nearly tripled during each of the following five-
year periods. Hence, net in-migration to the South now seems firmly
established.
6U.S. Bureau of the Census (1981c), Table No. 31.
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TABLE 4. IN-MIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION, AND NET-MIGRATION FOR REGIONS:
1955-1960, 1965-1970, 1970-1975, 1975-1980, AND 1980-1985
(of persons 5 and over in thousands)
Reqion 1955-60 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85
Northeast
In-Migrants 1,044 1,273 1,057 1,106 1,218
Out-Migrants 1,683 1,988 2,399 2,592 2,240
Net-Migrants -639 -715 -1,342 -1,486 -1,022
Midwest
In-Migrants 1,702 2,024 1,731 1,993 1,901
Out-Migrants 2,545 2,661 2,926 3,166 3,426
Net-Migrants -842 637 -1,195 -1,173 -1,525
South
In-Migrants 2,490 3,142 4,082 4,204 4,428
Out-Migrants 2,435 2,486 2,253 2,440 2,530
Net-Migrants + 56 +656 +1 ,829 +1 ,764 +1,898
West
In-Migrants 2,488 2,309 2,347 2,838 2,641
Out-Migrants 1,062 1,613 1,639 1,945 1,992
Net-Migrants +1 ,426 +696 +708 +893 +649
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 420,
"Geographical Mobility: 1985," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1987), Table G.
The most recent annual migration data are presented in Table 5. During
the last five years of the 1980s, for which data are available, the Northeast
and Midwest continued to experience a net loss of migrants to other regions.
The South and West had net gains in every year. The only exception to this
pattern was the West, which experienced a net loss of migrants during the
1983-84 period.
During the 1970s the South gained about two new migrants for every
one gained by the West; during the 1980s this ratio rose to three to one. Net
out-migration from the Northeast and Midwest nearly doubled between the
late 1960s and both the early and the late 1970s. This increased net out-
migration reflects the weak employment performance of these regions during
the 1970s; the feedback effects of the net out-migration further reduced their
employment performance. Net out-migration slackened somewhat in the
15
TABLE 5. ANNUAL IN-MIGRATION, OUT-MIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION
FOR REGIONS: 1982-1987 (in thoiusands)
Region 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
Northeast
In-Migrants 439 487 482 502 398
Out-Migrants 625 578 691 752 732
Net-Migrants -186 -91 -209 -250 -334
Midwest
In-Migrants 661 820 842 1,011 858
Out-Migrants 947 1,102 1,053 996 969
Net Migrants -286 -282 -211 +15 -111
South
In-Migrants 1,211 1,399 1,329 1,355 1,374
Out-Migrants 973 973 1.169 1,320 1,095
Net Migrants +238 +426 +160 +35 +279
West
In-Migrants 880 834 994 910 916
Out-Migrants 645 887 734 710 750
Net Migrants +235 -53 +260 +200 +166
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 430,
"Geographical Mobility: March 1986 to March 1987," (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989), Table F.
Northeast in the early 1980s as its economy improved, but out-migration con-
tinued to rise in the Midwest. Increased out-migration from the Northeast
and Midwest and increased in-migration to the South were thus largely
responsible for internal migration's impact on inter-regional population redis-
tribution during the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1960s.
As measured by the residual method, the South's net migration
amounted to 5.99 million during the 1970s and 4.5 million between 1980 and
1988. By comparison, net migration in the West amounted to 4.12 million in
the 1970s and 3.5 million during the 1980-88 period (Table 3). These figures
refer to both internal and international migration, which together accounted
for about one half of the incremental population of the South and West during
the last two decades.
Migration is strongly correlated with age. As Table 6 shows, migration
propensities peak at about 25 years of age, then decline sharply at older ages.
Although within any given age class migration propensities are generally
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higher for those with more education, this tendency for the propensity to
migrate to fall with age holds across all levels of education. Interstate migra-
tion propensities for those 25 to 29 years old range from about 2.0 to about 3.5
times the propensities of those 45 to 64 years old, depending upon education.
The second highest migration propensities are observed for those in the 18-24
age range, the prime recruiting years for the military.
TABLE 6. PROPENSITIES TO MIGRATE INTERSTATE, 1975-1980 AND 1980-1985,
BY AGE AND EDUCATION
Age'
Education Years 8-24 25-29 30-34 35-44 45-64
1975-80































































Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 368,
"Geographical Mobility: March 1975 to March 1980," (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1981), Table 24, and No. 420, "Geographical Mobility:
1985," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), Table 17.
aThe base population is the relevant number of nonmovers over the 1975 to 1980 (1980 to 1985)
period, plus out-migrants. Age is defined as of 1980 (1985).
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Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s the volume of inter-regional
migration increased by about 16 percent (from 8.7 million between 1965 and
1970 to 9.2 million between 1970 and 1975 to 10.1 million between 1975 and
1980). This increase was due neither to a general increase in the volume of
interstate migration nor to an increase in the propensity to migrate between
states.
The evidence clearly points to the maturing of the baby boom through
the most mobile age classes as a major factor contributing to migration to the
South and West during the 1970s and early 1980s. Table 7 shows the age dis-
tribution of the nation's population in I960, 1970, and 1980, and it also shows
the absolute change in each age class during the 1960s and the 1970s. Note
that during the 1960s the earliest baby boom cohorts were beginning to move
into their twenties. During this decade the population aged 20 to 39 increased
by about 6.3 million. However, during the 1970s, as the baby boom displaced
the relatively small cohort born during the 1930s in this age class, the popu-
lation aged 20 to 39 grew by 20.0 million. Consequently, an enormous
increase occurred in the size of the population with the highest propensities
to make an interstate move.
In itself, such an increase need not have caused the observed levels of
interregional migration because in addition to a propensity to move, the
young baby boom population must also have had an incentive to move. Eco-
nomic incentives clearly existed. As pointed out above, during the 1970s
nearly 73 percent of the nation's incremental nonagricultural jobs (20.1 mil-
lion) accrued to the South and West (Table 2). Like its population counter-
part, this figure differs substantially from the corresponding figure for the
1960s (57.3 percent). During the 1950s the South and West accounted for 64.1
percent of incremental national nonagricultural employment. Hence, during
the 1970s job prospects were considerably better in these regions than in the
Northeast and Midwest. Since unemployment rates also tend to be consider-
ably higher among those in their twenties than those in their forties, this
added incentive existed for the baby boom population to move out of the
Northeast and Midwest regions where job prospects were relatively poor and
the prospects for unemployment were relatively high and to the South and
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West where an opposite set of circumstances existed. 7 The very size of the
baby boom itself may also have contributed to higher unemployment rates for
its members.




Age 1960 1970 1980 1970-80
All ages 179,323 203,212 226,546 23,889 23,334
Under 5 20,321 17,154 16,348 -3,167 -806
5-9 18,692 19,956 16,700 1,264 -3,256
10-14 16,773 20,789 18,242 4,016 -2,547
15-19 13,219 19,070 21,168 5,851 2,098
20-24 10,801 16,371 21,319 5,570 4,948
25-29 10,869 13,477 19,521 2,608 6,044
30-34 11,949 1 1 ,430 17,561 -519 6,131
35-39 12,481 11,107 13,965 -1,374 2,858
40-44 11,600 11,981 11,669 381 -312
45-49 10,879 12,116 11,090 1,237 -1,026
50-54 9,606 11,104 11,710 1,498 606
55-59 8,430 9,973 11,615 1,543 1,642
60-64 7,142 8,617 10,088 1,475 1,471
65-69 6,258 6,992 8,782 734 1,790
70-74 4,739 5,444 6,798 705 1,354
75 and over 5,563 7,630 9,969 2,067 2,339
Median 29.5 28.1 30.0 — —
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population. Volume 1 , Characteristics of
the Population, PC80-1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981),
Table 44; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population. Volume 1,
Characteristics of the Population, Part 1 , United States Summary—Section 1
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), Table 53.
7For example, in 1980 the average unemployment rate of persons 20 to 24 years of age (11.5
percent) was almost three times higher than that of persons 45 to 54 years of age (4.0
percent). Using micro data, DaVanzo (1978) shows that families whose heads are looking for
work are more likely to move than families whose heads are not looking. Moreover, the
unemployed are more likely to move than the employed.
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However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the volume of interstate migra-
tion remained about the same and may have decreased slightly.8 Perhaps of
even greater importance, the propensity to make an interstate move declined
substantially. For example, the propensity to make an annual interstate
move fell from an average of 3.47 percent between 1965-66 and 1970-71 to
2.97 percent in 1975-76 and then to 2.80 percent in 1980-81. The propensity
of young persons to migrate between states fell even more dramatically. For
persons 20 to 24 years of age, this propensity fell from 9.38 percent in 1965-
66 to 8.77 percent in 1970-71; it then fell from 6.83 percent in 1975-76 to
5.80 percent in 1980-81.9 Thus, the 1980-81 figure for this relatively highly
mobile age group was only about two-thirds as high as the 1970-71 figure.
When moves of all types are considered, the data reveals that the overall
mobility of the population is decreasing. Through the decades of the 50s and
60s, about 20 percent of the population made a move of some type each year.
By 1982, the rate fell to a low of 16.6 percent. Although mobility briefly
reached 20 percent again in 1985, since then it has remained below 20 per-
cent. The reduction in mobility is composed of decreases in moves over
shorter distances (within counties) and over longer distances (between
states), while movement over intermediate distances (between counties with-
in a state) has remained steady. Demographers have not been able to fully
explain this overall decline in mobility. Aging of the baby boom appears to be
8Average annual levels of interstate migration (in thousands) are as follows: 1947-48 to
1949-50-^4,330; 1950-51 to 1959-60—5,306; 1960-61 to 1969-70—6,121; and 1970-71 to
1979-80—6,168. However, the greatest volumes occurred during 1964-65 (6,597) and 1967-
68 (6,607). Because during the 1970s annual migration data are available for only 1970-71
and 1975-76, the figure for the 1970s is not strictly comparable to that for the 1960s or
earlier periods.
9Greenwood, Hunt, and McDowell (1986) show that migration propensities vary with
national economic conditions, rising during upturns in economic activity and falling during
downturns. Thus, the 1975-76 and 1980-81 figures reported here could have been affected by
national recessions. The nature of the migration question asked in the Current Population
Survey does not allow comparable information on one-year flows to be reported for the late
1970s. However, the question changed back to a one-year basis in the 1980s, and the results
suggest that migration propensities remained low even after recovery from the recession of
the early 1980s. For example, the figure for persons 20 to 24 years of age (for interstate
migration) was 5.52 percent for 1984-85.
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a factor, but other factors are also at work. 10 Nonetheless, this drop in
mobility, especially of the youth population, and the contributing factors may
have important implications for future recruiting.
The largest effect will be registered in the "graduate" market—the
segment of the recruiting market consisting of youth no longer in school. This
market will be less volatile and, because addresses will remain accurate for
longer periods, recruiters will have an easier task in canvassing. Beyond this,
however, the effect of declining mobility or recruitment of others, especially
high school seniors, will be difficult to predict. For example, at the aggregate
level, it is not known how changes in migration rates affect an area's recruit-
ing potential. Similarly, at the micro-level, it is not known how individual or
family mobility affects the enlistment propensity of youth. These topics
should be high on the future research agenda.
10See Larry Long, Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1988, and his "Americans on the Move," American Demographics,
June 1990, pp. 46--49.
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V. REGIONAL RECRUITMENT PATTERNS
It is useful at this point to examine the historical pattern of military and
Army recruiting in the context of the shifts in population, migration, and eco-
nomic activity sketched above. Recall that population growth in the South
and West occurred via both natural increase and net in-migration. Thus, not
only did total population grow, the age structure also became more youthful
in these regions. Table 8 shows the population in the 18-24 age group
(numbers and percentages) for each major region between 1980 and 1990.
Even though the total number of 18-24 year olds declined, the share of this
age group residing in the South and West increased from 53 percent in 1980
to 56 percent in 1990.
TABLE 8. POPULATION 18-24 YEARS OLD BY REGION
Thousands Percent Distribution
Region 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
Northeast 5,360 6,163 5,123 4,421 22.6% 20.5% 19.7% 17.7%
Midwest 6,444 7,872 6,112 5,535 27.2 26.2 23.6 22.1
South 7,634 10,066 9,248 9,226 32.2 33.5 35.7 36.9
West 4,278 5,921 5,415 5,806 18.0 19.7 20.9 23.2
Total 23,697 30,022 25,897 24,987 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990. Washington, DC,
1989.
As one might expect, the percentage contribution of the South and West
to military accessions increased over this period. Table 9 provides details of
the percent distribution ofDOD non-prior service accessions by Census region
and division, and compares this to the youth population distribution for
selected years. These data reveal that the share of accessions from the South
and West has grown from 56 percent in 1974 to around 60 percent in the late
1980s. The Northeast has experienced a pronounced drop in its enlistment
share, from a peak of 22.2 percent in 1977 to only 14 percent in 1989.
22
TABLE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF DOD NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS AND
YOUTH POPULATION (PERCENT), VARIOUS YEARS







































































































































Notes: a Youth population based on 17-21 year olds in 1974, 1977, and 1984;
18-24 year olds in 1989.
b Census Bureau changed "North Central" region to "Midwest" after 1984.
Sources: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P), Population Representation in the
Military Services, various years.
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These overall regional military recruitment patterns are repeated in
Table 10 for the individual services. The fall in the percentage of enlistments
from the Northeast is observed for all four branches, but is especially striking
for the Navy. The South and West have increased their contribution to Navy
enlistments by nearly 10 percentage points over this period. For the other
services, the growth in recruiting in the South and West regions has been
more modest, but still significant.
TABLE 10. NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS BY REGION BY SERVICE,
1979 TO 1989 (in percentages)
Branch/Region 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Army
Northeast 26.4 28.3 26.0 24.0 28.2 24.6 25.2 24.5 22.6 20.2 20.0
Midwest 20.7 22.5 27.5 25.2 32.3 28.7 27.9 26.9 24.7 26.0 24.4
South 36.5 33.3 34.2 25.9 36.1 33.4 32.9 33.9 35.4 38.5 40.0
West 16.4 15.9 12.3 24.9 3.4 13.3 14.0 14.7 17.3 15.3 15.6
Navy
Northeast 35.7 34.1 34.7 36.0 34.4 33.5 33.3 32.4 29.6 29.5 26.6
Midwest 25.8 27.0 28.2 28.7 27.6 28.1 27.5 27.1 28.1 28.5 27.0
South 19.9 18.8 18.4 17.7 19.1 188 19.9 19.6 20.5 21.1 25.3
West 18.6 20.1 18.7 17.6 18.9 19.6 19.3 20.9 21.8 20.9 21.1
Air Force
Northeast 24.5 23.5 23.7 23.1 23.4 23.3 23.3 20.4 21.2 17.8 16.2
Midwest 28.6 29.6 28.7 29.7 29.6 28.9 29.9 27.0 25.7 24.5 25.3
South 31.1 31.0 31.3 30.4 30.7 30.9 31.1 31.5 33.2 36.9 36.1
West 15.8 15.9 16.3 16.8 16.3 16.9 15.7 21.1 19.9 20.8 22.4
Marine Corps
Northeast 23.9 22.6 22.9 23.1 22.2 22.2 21.8 18.9 17.9 17.6 16.9
Midwest 22.9 24.7 25.7 26.9 27.4 28.5 26.8 27.4 26.4 26.8 25.8
South 35.7 35.2 32.8 33.6 32.3 32.0 33.5 35.3 37.7 37.0 38.4
West 17.5 17.5 18.6 16.4 18.1 17.3 17.9 18.4 18.0 18.6 18.9
Source: Provided by Detense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).
Table 11 reports the share of non-prior service accessions for the indi-
vidual states for 1988. One important aspect of these state-level figures is the
relatively greater reliance by the Army on the South as a source of enlist-
ments. Furthermore, within the South the Army pulls a disproportionate
share of enlistments from the South Atlantic division, and within this division
enlistments are drawn disproportionately from the states of Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.
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TABLE 1 1 . ENLISTED ACCESSIONS BY STATE AND SERVICE: 1988 (in percentages)
Census Region/
Division/ Armed Marine Air
State Forces Army Navy Corps Force
North East Region 15.5 13.2 16.7 17.2 17.1
New England Division 3.4 2.9 3.4 4.0 4.4
Maine .6 .5 .6 .6 .7
New Hampshire .4 .3 .3 .5 .5
Vermont .2 .2 .2 .2 .3
Massachusetts 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.7
Rhode Island .3 .2 .3 .4 .3
Connecticut .7 .6 .7 .6 .9
Middle Atlantic Division 12.1 10.3 13.3 13.2 12.6
New York 5.4 4.8 5.8 6.4 5.3
New Jersey 1.7 1.4 2.1 2.0 1.5
Pennsylvania 4.9 4.1 5.4 4.9 5.8
North Central Region 26.7 26.7 26.6 26.3 27.4
East North Central Division 18.9 19.2 18.7 18.5 19.1
Ohio 5.5 5.2 5.6 5.3 6.0
Indiana 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.9
Illinois 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.6 3.8
Michigan 4.5 4.9 4.3 4.2 4.2
Wisconsin 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2
West North Central Division 7.8 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.4
Minnesota 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.7 2.0
Iowa 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6
Missouri 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.3
North Dakota ..3 .3 .3 .4 .3
South Dakota .4 .5 .3 .5 .5
Nebraska .8 .7 .8 1.0 1.0
Kansas 1.0 1.1 1.0 .7 .8
South Region 38.5 41.6 36.7 35.9 36.6
South Atlantic Division 18.0 19.5 77.4 16.4 17.2
Delaware .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Maryland 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.6
District of Columbia .2 .2 .1 .2 .1
Virginia 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.5
West Virginia 1.1 1.1 .9 1.0 1.2
North Carolina 2.8 3.1 2.6 2.2 2.6
South Carolina 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
Georgia 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.5 2.2
Florida 5.2 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.2
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TABLE 1 1 . ENLISTED ACCESSIONS BY STATE AND SERVICE: 1 988 (in percentages)
(Continued)
Census Region/
Division/ Armed Marine Air
State Forces Army Navy Corps Force
East South Central Division 7.0 7.3 7.4 5.6 6.3
Kentucky 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.5
Tennessee 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.0
Alabama 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.7
Mississippi 1.3 1.4 1.3 .9 1.2
West South Central Division 13.5 14.8 11.9 13.9 13.1
Arkansas 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.5
Louisiana 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.1
Oklahoma 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.7
Texas 8.1 8.9 6.9 8.9 7.8
West Region 19.3 18.5 20.0 20.6 19.0
Mountain Division 6.4 6.1 6.5 6.7 6.9
Montana .5 .5 .5 .4 .8
Idaho .6 .6 .6 .7 .7
Wyoming .3 .3 .3 .2 .3
Colorado 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.8
New Mexico .8 .7 .9 .7 .9
Arizona 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.4
Utah .5 .4 .5 .5 .6
Nevada .4 s.H .4 .5 .5
Pacific Division 12.9 12.4 13.5 13.9 12.0
Washington 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1
Oregon 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4
California 8.6 81 9.1 9.4 8.0
Alaska .2 .2 .1 .3 .2
Hawaii .3 .3 .3 .2 .4
United States Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Data for civilians from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey,
March 1988; data for enlisted personnel from Defense Manpower Center (DMDC).
Although there appears to be a link between regional demographic shifts
and recruiting shifts, two caveats must be mentioned. First, it is apparent
from Table 10 that a significant factor in explaining observed changes in
regional recruiting over time is the changing pattern of economic conditions
across regions. The recession of 1981-1982 was particularly severe in the
Northeast and Midwest, which partly explains why accession shares in these
regions attained historic highs during that period. Since that time, the
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economy of the Northeast has recovered and grown faster than the national
growth rate. Conversely, the West South Central division suffered a severe
recession in the mid-1980s due to a drop in energy prices. This regional down-
turn was an important factor in the growth of that division, and the Southern
region as a whole, as a source of enlistments. Thus, while demographic
changes are important, their main effects appear to be registered in the long
run. In the short-run, economic conditions are the main determinant of
regional recruiting success. Moreover, even in the long run economic shifts,
migration, and population patterns are interrelated, and separating cause
and effect has proven to be a difficult analytical task for researchers (more on
this below).
Another factor that bears on the relationship between regional popula-
tion changes and recruitment is that the Recruiting Command tends to
respond to changes in economic conditions across regions by shifting recruit-
ing resources. Also, given the distribution of recruiters, recruiting mission is
distributed to recruiters on the basis of what is considered a "fair share" of
the market, which in turn is based partly on past recruiting success in the
area. In the short run, when the geographic distribution of recruiters is fixed,
mission tends to fall as recruiting conditions in an area worsen. But in the
long run, recruiters tend to be reassigned to areas with stronger markets.
When policy shifts such as these occur, the observed recruiting numbers
reflect the policy changes as much as the changes in demographic conditions.
Table 12 displays the distribution of accessions and population for 1989.
The first column displays the percentage of NPS accessions for each
region/division/state, while the second column displays the percentage of the
18 to 24 year old population for each area. The "representation ratio" in the
third column is obtained by simply dividing the accession and youth popula-
tion percentages. Ratios above 1.0 indicate that an area's accession share
exceeds its population share; ratios below 1.0 indicate the reverse.
Two observations emerge from Table 12. First, examining recruiting and
demographic information for aggregated census regions and division may
obscure the significant variation that occurs at the state level. For example,
while the West region reveals an overall representation ratio of .95, nine of
the 13 western states had ratios that exceeded 1.0. In fact, several western
states had some of the highest representation ratios of any U.S. state. It is
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TABLE 12. POPULATION REPRESENTATION RATIO FOR EACH REGION, DIVISION
AND STATE: 1989
Area's Area's
Census Region/ Percentage Percentage
Division/ of all NPS of all 18-24 Representation
State Accessions Year Olds Ratio
Northeast Region 14.15 20.80 0.68
New England Division 3.20 5.47 .59
Maine .54 .44 1.22
New Hampshire .39 .41 .95
Vermont .20 .17 1.17
Massachusetts 1.16 2.59 .45
Rhode Island .21 .40 .54
Connecticut 68 1.45 .47
Middle Atlantic Division 10.95 15.33 .71
New York 5.06 7.75 .65
New Jersey 1.52 320 .47
Pennsylvania 4.37 4.38 1.00
North Central Region 25.90 24.95 1.04
East North Central Division 18.28 17.58 1.04
Ohio 5.21 4.65 1.12
Indiana 2.43 2.19 1.11
Illinois 4.18 5.02 .83
Michigan 4.53 3.94 1.15
Wisconsin 1.93 1.77 1.09
West North Central Division 7.62 7.37 1.03
Minessota 1.47 1.85 .79
Iowa 1.24 1.06 1.17
Missouri 2.43 2.22 1.09
North Dakota .29 .25 1.13
South Dakota .39 .28 1.38
Nebraska .80 .60 1.32
Kansas 1.02 1.10 .92
South Region 40.29 33.65 1.20
South Atlantic Division 18.77 16.43 1.14
Delaware .20 .30 .68
Maryland 1.66 1.90 .87
District of Columbia .17 .26 .68
Virginia 2.52 2.33 1.08
West Virginia 1.00 .71 1.41
North Carolina 2.81 2.62 1.07
South Carolina 1.79 1.27 1.41
Georgia 3.06 2.55 1.20
Florida 5.54 4.49 1.23
28
TABLE 12. POPULATION REPRESENTATION RATIO FOR EACH REGION, DIVISION
AND STATE: 1989 (Continued)
Area's Area's
Census Region/ Percentage Percentage
Division/ of all NPS of all 18-24 Representation
State Accessions Year Olds Ratio
East South Central Division 7.46 6.44 1.16
Kentucky 1.79 1.48 1.21
Tennessee 2.02 2.38 .85
Alabama 2.22 1.48 1.50
Mississippi 1.43 1.09 1.31
West South Central Division 14.06 10.79 1.30
Arkansas 1.39 1.01 1.38
Louisiana 2.52 1.80 1.40
Oklahoma 1.64 1.27 1.30
Texas 8.51 6.72 1.27
West Region 19.67 20.60 .95
Mountain Division 6.54 5.13 1.27
Montana .54 .27 2.01
Idaho .58 .34 1.67
Wyoming .30 .18 1.73
Colorado 1.67 1.23 1.36
New Mexico .92 .61 1.52
Arizona 1.56 1.30 1.20
Utah .51 .73 .69
Nevada .45 .46 .98
Pacific Division 13.13 15.47 .85
Washington 2.20 1.51 1.46
Oregon 1.47 .98 1.49
California 8.98 12.50 .72
Alaska .18 .17 1.06
Hawaii .29 .30 .97
United States Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Population Representation in the
Military Services, 1989.
mainly California, with a ratio of only .72, that pulled down the average ratio
for the western region.
A second point is that economic conditions, once again, help explain the
relative cross sectional (point in time) pattern of accessions. The states with
the lowest (highest) representation ratios were also those with unemployment
rates well below (above) the national average. The correlation coefficient
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between the 1989 state unemployment rates and the representation ratios
was .51, indicating that economic conditions are strongly associated with the
ability and propensity of regional populations to supply manpower to the mil-
itary services. 11
nOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P), Population Representation in the
Military Services FY 1989 (Washington, DC: 1990).
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VI. CAUSES OF THE REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND
POPULATION SHIFTS
Frey and Speare characterize the 1970s as "a transition decade in the
recent history of United States population redistribution'' (1988, p. 6). They
argue that before this time the nation's population was generally shifting to
the West at the expense of the other regions. Larger metropolitan areas were
growing more rapidly than smaller ones, nonmetropolitan-to-metropolitan
migration favored all metropolitan areas, and suburbs grew at the expense of
central cities. During the 1970s, however, these patterns began changing in
fundamental ways that are not completely understood.
These authors go on to argue that although during the 1950s and 1960s
migration tended to favor high-wage areas, during the 1970s it favored low-
wage areas. Migration, they stress, "did not conform to the conventional eco-
nomic 'micro-models' which assume that migrants move from areas with low
wages to areas with higher wages" (1988, p. 439). Rather, they see "regional
restructuring by deindustrialization" as the major source of the shifts. They
do not, however, offer a theoretical perspective or even a persuasive argument
for why such restructuring should have occurred.
The literature on changing patterns of regional growth suggests several
forces that underlie the employment and population behavior of the 1970s
and early 1980s. Broadly speaking, the patterns of regional change described
above must stem from some mixture of supply of, and demand for, labor at
alternative locations. For example, on the demand side, during the 1970s ris-
ing energy prices, combined with environmental restrictions on the consump-
tion of certain fuels, stimulated new economic activity in many areas of the
South and West (McCarthy and Morrison, 1977), while discouraging it in
many areas of the Northeast and Midwest (Tolley and Graves, 1981). Due to a
combination of increased incomes, changed preferences for amenities, and
changed prices of amenities, recent years have also seen increased demands
for environmental amenities. In many cases, the increased demand for loca-
tion-specific amenities can be satisfied only by movement to the South or
West (Graves, 1979). The federal government has probably also played some
role in the shift of employment to the South and West (Coleman, 1978;
Greenwood, Hunt, and Pfalzgraff, 1987). These forces have contributed to a
shift of market potential, both among intermediate suppliers and producers of
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final goods and services, which in cumulative fashion has attracted still more
employers and workers.
Whereas the forces mentioned above and others have been important in
the shifts of population and employment to the South and West, for purposes
of the present argument, perhaps the most important is the changing relative
cost of doing business in old industrial regions of the country. Diseconomies
associated with dense urban locations, in combination with the declining rel-
ative importance of distance, have increasingly improved the competitive
position of less densely populated areas. Moreover, lack of unionization,
coupled with the continued location in these regions of both internal migrants
and immigrants, as well as a sizeable untapped pool of potential indigenous
workers, allowed considerable employment growth to occur without causing
wages to converge rapidly to the national average.
Several analysts have attempted to evaluate quantitatively the contribu-
tion of various factors to changes in the location of economic activity from the
North to the South. In an early study, Fuchs (1962) assigned a one-third con-
tribution to each of three factors: the lower cost of labor, the "pull" of natural
resources, and demand-side and unexplained forces. Later studies have
attributed an even smaller role to the existence of low-cost nonunion labor in
the South (Plaut and Pluta, 1983; Carlton, 1983). Rather, they stressed the
importance of the "business climate" in attracting new businesses and better
weather in attracting individuals.
There has been some controversy over whether the relocation of manu-
facturing firms has narrowed the historic North-South wage differential in
manufacturing. The consensus appears to be that real wages in the South are
no lower than in the North after differences in the human capital (education,
skills, training) of the labor force are controlled. Yet, one of the more impor-
tant consequences of the shifts of businesses to the Sun Belt has been a defi-
nite narrowing of regional differences in per capita income (Crandall, 1988).
Why this difference?
A simple explanation is that the North-South wage differential is com-
monly measured solely for manufacturing, a sector that currently accounts for
only about 20 percent of the labor force. A more important factor in explain-
ing the narrowing of regional per capita income differences is the changing
composition of the labor force in the North and South. Between 1960 and
1980, differences across regions in median years of school dropped sharply
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(Crandall, 1988). In addition, the share of prime age workers (ages 25 to 44)
in the labor force rose more rapidly in the South than in the North. These
demographic trends in the labor force also provide some clues to future
changes in population and economic activity in the Sun Belt and Rust Belt.
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VII. PROSPECTS OF THE CONTINUATION OF THE SHIFT
Regional growth and decline are probably characterized most accurately
within a general equilibrium framework. Even the most primitive predictions
of future patterns of regional growth are best made within such a framework,
which is necessarily complex and becomes more complex the further one
wishes to look to the future. In the very long run, even small changes in the
net spatial utility and/or production advantages of various locations can have
profound implications that are not well anticipated at the present time. In the
broad predictions that follow, the time frame is about 20 to 25 years, before
the baby boom cohort begins aging into retirement, which could produce
another massive population shift to the South and West that triggers another
significant employment shift.
Although certain cumulative and self-reinforcing forces are operating to
maintain the advantages of the South and West, the sharp regional differ-
ences observed during the 1970s and early 1980s are unlikely to be main-
tained in the future. Indeed, powerful demographic forces are operating to
reduce interregional migration and the sizeable employment growth differ-
entials observed in recent years.
Between 1970 and 1980 a convergence occurred in regional employment
to population ratios (Table 13). Most noteworthy, over this period the South's
ratio increased from 0.32 to 0.39 and in 1980 was almost equal to the national
average (0.40). What if the South's employment to population ratio had
remained at 0.32 in 1980? A population of 91.1 million would have been
required to accommodate employment of 29.1 million jobs, or about 15.7
million more people would have been required than were actually residing in
the South in 1980. Thus, over four times the observed internal migration
would have been required during the 1970-1980 period to accommodate the
South's employment growth during the same period, and over twice the total
migration would have been required. Consequently, the ability of the indige-
nous population to respond to employment growth served as a buffer that
necessitated less migration than would otherwise have been required.
Because the South's employment to population ratio is now close to the
national average, the potential for the South's population to provide a differ-
ential labor supply response to employment growth seems largely exhausted,
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TABLE 13. RATIOS OF NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT TO POPULATION,
BY CENSUS DIVISION, 1950-1980


































































United States 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.40
Source: Calculated from employment data referenced in Table 2 and population data from
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1986 (106th
edition). Washington, DC, 1985, Table 11.
which suggests that in the future the South's population growth will more
closely mirror its employment growth. Since the baby boom has largely
matured out of the most mobile age classes nationwide, the national pool of
potential migrants has also shrunk, which suggests further that employment-
growth differentials strongly favoring the South (and the West) will not per-
sist in the future.
The above observations suggest that initially the South's labor supply
was more elastic, which may have allowed labor demand to grow for a time
without placing strong upward pressure on wage rates. This lack of strong
wage pressure allowed wages in the South to remain relatively low, which
allowed the South to maintain its position as a relatively low-wage region.
However, now that the South's employment-to-population ratio has converged
almost to the national average, continued differential growth of labor demand
will probably drive up wages and somewhat reduce the competitive advan-
tage of relatively low wages that has in the past characterized much of the
South.
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Not only does job growth attract migrants, but also migrants encourage
growth of employment. Greenwood and Hunt (1984) show that for an average
U.S. metropolitan area, 100 new jobs will be filled by between 40 and 50 (net)
migrants. Moreover, Muth (1971), followed by Greenwood and Hunt (1984),
shows that another employed migrant results in approximately one more job.
With a population-employment ratio of 2.5 to 1 and with about 5.2 million net
internal migrants to the South and West between 1970 and 1980, approxi-
mately 2.1 million jobs were shifted from the Northeast and Midwest to the
South and West through internal migration.
The educational selectivity of migration also clearly favored the South
and the West during the 1970s. 12 Only these two regions had a favorable bal-
ance of migration of persons with four or more years of college. Between 1975
and 1980, for example, the South gained 137 persons with four or more years
of education for every 100 such persons it lost (Table 14). The West attracted
179 such in-migrants for every 100 such out-migrants. On the other hand, the
Northeast gained 53 of these persons for every 100 lost, and the Midwest
gained 67 per 100 lost. These highly educated migrants ought to have con-
tributed to the differentially rapid employment growth that was observed in
the South and West.
The maturing of the baby boom out of the most mobile age classes should
also have depressed the stock of well-educated young people from which
southern and western in-migrants were drawn during the 1970s and 1980s. If
they are to maintain their ability to capture roughly the same number of
young, well-educated migrants, the South and West must attract a relatively
higher share of the shrinking national pool of such persons. Thus, presum-
ably the relative wages available to them in the South and West must be suf-
ficiently higher compared to those available to the baby boom, or some other
factor or factors must operate to increase their propensity to move to the
South and West.
12Pursell (1977) shows that for the 1965-70 period southern net in-migration "was skewed
toward the younger male, under 35, better educated, with more than 12 years of education."
He goes on to conclude that "the southern states appear to have shifted dramatically from a
net exporter to a net importer of human capital."
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TABLE 14. INTERREGIONAL MIGRATION OF PERSONS 25 AND OVER WITH FOUR






From Northeast Midwest South West Out Out-migrants
1975-1980
Northeast — 99 264 149 512 53
Midwest 92 — 209 241 542 67
South 134 158 — 167 459 137
West 47 107 157 — 311 179
Total In 273 364 630 557
1980-1985
Northeast — 110 292 153 555 66
Midwest 122 — 350 228 700 53
South 181 156 — 204 541 160
West 66 105 222 — 393 149
Total In 369 371 864 585 — —
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 368, "Geographical
Mobility: March 1975 to March 1980" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1981),
Tables 41 and 42, "Geographical Mobility: 1985," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), Table 20.
The maturing of the baby boom out of the most mobile age classes will
likely cause the population and employment shifts to the South and West to
slow relative to the recent past. In the early 1990s, the youngest members of
the baby boom cohort will almost all be in their thirties. The main bulge of
baby boomers will be 35 to 44 years of age, as can be seen by adding 10 years
to the "age" column of Table 7. Thus, the interstate migration rates of this
older group will only be about half of what they were when its members were
in their late twenties.
While we will have to wait a few years to see if, in fact, regional popula-
tion counts or estimates reflect these predictions, preliminary analysis of the
1990 Census shows that population growth in the South and West did slow in
the late 1980s (Lewis, 1991). By contrast, in the Northeast and Midwest, 18
metropolitan areas that had been losing population gained population in the
late 1980s. The slowdown in the South and West was concentrated in the
interior areas, especially those areas in which oil and mining industries are
located.
As pointed out above, from their peak at about 25 years of age, migration
propensities decline steadily with age, at least until retirement age is reached
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at approximately 65. If the baby boom cohort were somehow different such
that migration propensities increased at later ages, or did not fall as rapidly,
more migration could potentially occur than would otherwise have been the
case as the baby boom ages. Data indicate that the age profile of migration
propensities is qualitatively the same for the baby boom as for the population
in general. Although available data do not suit themselves ideally to address-
ing this issue, they seem to indicate that the baby boom has lower rather
than higher interstate migration propensities than its immediate predecessor
cohort.
Data reported above, however, may suggest the beginning of a new era
in regional population and employment change. As the youngest of the baby
boom matured through the most mobile age classes (roughly, in the mid-
twenties), the volume of inter-regional migration increased only slightly dur-
ing the 1980- 85 period (10.2 million) relative to the 1975-80 period (10.1 mil-
lion) (Table 4). In the absence of unforeseen circumstances, this volume will
probably decline between 1985 and 1990, and especially after 1990. Migration
from abroad will consequently play a relatively more important role in the
South and West than was previously the case.
As the population projections reported below in Section VTII will show, in
future years the population in the most highly mobile age groups will decline
substantially, and the South and West will not have the sizeable pool of
potential migrants to draw upon nationally that they have had during the
recent past. 13 Of course, when the baby boom begins to age into retirement
during the decade between 2010 and 2020, a great surge of retirement migra-
tion could occur to the South and West, and this migration could trigger sub-
stantial nonretirement migration and further employment growth.
Moreover, a slowdown may occur in the migration of the most highly
educated to the South and West not only because the pool of potentially
mobile, well-educated persons in their twenties and early thirties will shrink
nationally, but also because their interstate migration propensities appear to
be declining. Note that of the migration propensities reported in Table 5,
most of those for individuals with 4 years or with 5 or more years of education
are either down for the 1980 to 1985 period or up only slightly.
13According to Census projections, the population aged 20 to 39 will not again increase
absolutely until the period 2005-2010.
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All of this is not to say that the South and West will not continue to
experience more population and employment growth than the Northeast and
Midwest. The nature of U.S. immigration policy is such as to suggest that
heavy immigration will continue from Asian countries, Mexico, and the
Caribbean. These immigrants will continue to locate in relatively large num-
bers in coastal and border states of the South and West, like Florida, Texas,
and California. Differential rates of natural increase will probably also con-
tinue to favor southern and western areas, but because of the maturing of the
baby boom out of the ages with the highest fertility rates, perhaps not as
much as in the recent past.
Simultaneity between population and employment growth is well-estab-
lished in the migration literature. (Greenwood, 1975). Thus, employment
growth differentials that have strongly favored the South and West will also
relax somewhat in future years. During the first half of the 1980s, national
employment grew modestly compared to the prior 15 years. Whereas average
annual growth of nonagricultural employment was 2.0 million jobs between
1965 and 1980, it was 1.4 million between 1980 and 1985. These differences
are due to many factors, not the least of which is that the baby boom was ag-
ing into the labor force during the 1965—1980 period.
This slowdown in national employment growth translates to slower
regional employment growth. During the first half of the 1980s, the annual-
ized rate of growth of nonagricultural employment was only 54 percent as
high in the South as during the 1975-80 period and only 73 percent of that
during the 1970-75 period. The employment growth slowdown in the West
was even more dramatic. The employment growth rate for 1980—85 was 43
percent of that for 1975-80 and 65 percent that of 1970-75. Although be-
tween 1980 and 1985 nonagricultural employment hardly grew in the Mid-
west, in the Northeast it did quite well relative to the 1970s. Between 1970
and 1980 nonagricultural employment grew by 1.8 million in the Northeast,
whereas between 1980 and 1985 it grew by 1.5 million. These changed
employment growth patterns may be due in part to factors like recessions,
foreign trade competition, and oil price declines. In part they also mutually
interact with population change and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the
future, perhaps mirroring these changes even more closely than in the past.
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VIII. POPULATION AND MIGRATION PROJECTIONS
The Census Bureau provides four alternative series of projections of the
population of the 50 states and the District of Columbia for 1989 through
2010. Each series is based on a different assumption about future trends in
the components of change, including internal migration. While trends in all
components of population change are subject to variation, and future trends
are not easily predicted, internal migration is the most problematic in state-
level projections. 14 The range of population projections for individual states
varies widely across the four series and depends largely on internal migra-
tion. In addition, given the sensitivity of internal migration to changes in
economic conditions, international migration, mortality, and fertility, changes
in internal migration can be both rapid and sizeable. The four assumptions
concerning internal migration that underlie each series are discussed below.
Series A establishes a trend by estimating a linear regression model of
state-to-state migration using data for the period 1975-1988. When the
regression model produces extreme values, these values are restricted to be
within a certain range of the mean of the historical data. This provides a
composite method that attempts to meet four objectives:
a. To use a long time period so that random or abnormal fluctuations
are averaged out;
b. To use the most recent data available to reflect recent shifts in a
state's migration patterns;
c. To continue recent changes in migration rates so that emerging
trends are captured; and
d. To force convergence in the migration rates so that a return to some
equilibrium value is assured.
Series B uses the simple mean of the state-to-state migration rates
observed for the period 1975 to 1988. It is a straightforward approach based
on the average conditions over the entire period. Thus, the state-to-state
migration rate equals the arithmetic mean of its historical pattern.
14U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053, "Projections
of the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010." (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990).
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Series C uses the mean of the historical state-to-state migration rates for
a more recent period: 1985 through 1988. The mean of the more recent time
period is used in an attempt to smooth abnormal fluctuations. It assumes
that each state-to-state rate equals the arithmetic mean of the rate for each of
the years during the chosen internal, 1985-1988.
Series D adopts the extreme assumption of zero net internal migration.
This series shows what would occur to a state's population solely on the basis
of changes in fertility, mortality, and international migration alone. It pro-
vides a benchmark against which to measure the effects of any other projec-
tion that does include internal migration.
Table 15 shows the projections of the total resident population by region
from 1990 to 2010 for each of the four series, while Table 16 displays the cor-
responding shares of the population for each region. Table 17 shows the pro-
jected population growth rates for regions and divisions. Table 18 ranks each
state according to its projected growth rates over the next two decades. Table
19 provides projections of the components of population change for regions
and divisions.
The differences in the projections generated by each series are revealed
perhaps most strikingly in Table 17. For example, all four series forecast pos-
itive population growth rates over the decade of the 1990s for the Midwest.
However, the projected growth rate varies from a low of 0.4 percent using
Series A to a fairly robust 5.8 percent using Series D. The explanation, of
course, is the assumption of no net migration imbedded in Series D. This
assumption overstates potential population growth in regions most likely to
experience net out-migration, such as the Northeast and Midwest, and
understates growth in regions most likely to experience net in-migration,
such as the South and West. While migration is likely to slow in the next
decades, it is not likely to slow sufficiently to make Series D a realistic growth
scenario. If one ignores Series D, a narrower and more plausible range of
projected growth rates for each region is obtained.
Taken together, Tables 15 through 19 provide evidence that some of the
patterns that have predominated during the 1980s are likely to continue in
the 1990s and beyond. In the decade of the nineties almost 94 percent of the
net increase in the U.S. population will be concentrated in the South and
West; in the first decade of the 21st century, this percentage will be even
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TABLE 15. PROJECTIONS OF TOTAL POPULATION OF REGIONS, BY SERIES,
1989 TO 2010 (thousands)
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2010
SERIES A
NE 50,695 50,850 51,011 51.175 51,341 51,504 51,665 52,419 53,124 53,801
MW 60,089 60,288 60,443 60,556 60,636 60,687 60,712 60,528 60,110 56,696
S 85,545 86,517 87,485 88,445 89,389 90,317 91,227 95,575 99,678 103,529
W 51,404 52,237 53,045 53,826 54,582 55,311 56,015 59,226 62,174 65,030
SERIES B
NE 50,631 50,707 50,777 50,841 50,896 50,941 50,976 51,005 50,897 50,763
MW 60,025 60,205 60,374 60,528 60,669 60,798 60,914 61,342 61,668 61,997
S 85,624 86,644 87,636 88,600 89,534 90,440 91,317 95,382 99,101 102,577
W 51,453 52,336 53,197 54,034 54,848 55,641 56,412 60,019 63,421 66,719
SERIES C
NE 50,684 50,814 50,938 51,056 51,166 51,266 51,357 51,662 51,825 51,961
MW 60,072 60,296 60,510 60,706 60,889 61,058 61,213 61,815 62,289 62,744
S 85,547 86,489 87,404 88,291 89,149 89,979 90,781 94,483 97,857 101,008
W 51,431 52,292 53,132 53,949 54,744 55,517 56,269 59,788 63,114 66,344
SERIES D
NE 59,868 51,179 51,481 51.767 52,043 52,304 52,553 53,583 54,371 55,028
MW 50,286 60,723 61,148 61,552 61,940 62,312 62,665 64,231 65,584 66,824
S 85,304 85,998 86,673 87,325 87,950 88,553 89,132 91,750 94,113 96,318
W 51,277 51,990 52,684 53,357 54,013 54,649 55,271 58,186 61,018 63,886
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053, "Projections of
the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010," (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990).
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TABLE 1 6. PROJECTIONS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION OF
REGIONS, BY SERIES, 1989 TO 2010 (thousands)
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2010
SERIES A
NE 20.46 20.35 20.24 20.15 20.06 19.98 19.90 19.58 19.31 19.07
MW 24.26 24.13 23.99 23.84 23.69 23.54 23.38 22.61 21.85 21.16
S 34.53 34.62 34.72 34.82 34.92 35.03 35.14 35.69 36.24 36.71
W 20.75 20.90 21.05 21.19 21.33
SERIES B
21.45 21.58 22.12 22.60 23.06
NE 20.44 20.29 20.15 20.01 19.89 19.76 19.64 19.05 18.50 18.00
MW 24.23 24.09 23.96 23.83 23.70 23.58 23.46 22.91 22.42 21.98
S 34.56 34.68 34.78 34.88 34.98 35.08 35.17 35.62 36.03 35.37
w 20.77 20.94 21.11 21.28 21.43
SERIES C
21.58 21.73 22.42 23.05 23.65
NE 20.46 20.33 20.21 20.10 19.99 19.88 19.78 19.30 18.84 18.42
MW 24.25 24.13 24.01 23.90 23.79 23.68 23.58 23.09 22.64 22.25
S 34.53 34.61 34.69 34.76 34.83 34.90 34.97 35.29 35.57 35.81
W 20.76 20.93 21.09 21.24 21.39
SERIES D
21.54 21.67 22.32 22.95 23.52
NE 20.53 20.48 20.43 20.38 20.33 20.29 20.24 20.01 19.77 19.51
NW 24.34 24.30 24.27 24.23 24.20 24.17 24.14 23.99 23.84 23.69
S 34.43 34.41 34.40 34.38 34.36 34.35 34.33 34.27 34.21 34.15
W 20.70 20.81 20.90 21.01 21.11 21.19 21.29 21.73 22.18 22.65
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053, "Projections of
the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010," (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990).
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TABLE 17. PROJECTIONS OF POPULATION GROWTH RATES FOR REGIONS AND
DIVISIONS, BY SERIES: 1990 TO 2000 AND 2000 TO 2010





























































































































United States 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053,
"Projections of the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010,"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
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TABLE 18. STATES RANKED BY POPULATION CHANGE (in percent):
1990-2000 AND 2000-2010
1990-2000 2000-2010
State % Change State % Change
Arizona 12.1 Hawaii 15.9
Nevada 21.1 Arizona 15.2
New Mexico 20.6 New Mexico 14.2
Florida 20.3 Nevada 13.9
Georgia 194 Florida 13.7
Alaska 19.3 Georgia 13.7
Hawaii 17.9 California 11.5
New Hampshire 16.7 Alaska 11.4
California 15.0 Texas 10.2
Texas 14.1 New Hampshire 9.2
Utah 12.1 Utah 9.0
North Carolina 11.9 North Carolina 9.0
Virginia 11.7 Maryland 7.8
Maryland 11.5 Virginia 7.8
Colorado 11.0 South Carolina 7.7
Delaware 10.2 Delaware 7.6
South Carolina 10.1 Colorado 7.5
New Jersey 8.2 Washington 5.8
Washington 7.2 Mississippi 5.2
Mississippi 66 New Jersey 5.1
Tennessee 5.9 Alabama 4.5
Alabama 55 Tennessee 4.4
Vermont 5.2 Oklahoma 4.0
Connecticut 5.1 Oregon 4.0
Maine 4.9 Arkansas 3.8
Rhode Island 4.7 Rhode Island 3.4
Arkansas 42 Idaho 3.1
Oregon 4.0 Maine 2.9
Minnesota 38 Vermont 29
Missouri 3.7 Massachusetts 2.8
Massachusetts 3.5 Missouri 2.6
Idaho 2.9 Connecticut 2.5
Oklahoma 2.8 Minnesota 2.0
Kansas 1.5 Kansas 1.4
New York 1.2 South Dakota 1.1
South Dakota 0.8 New York 0.9
Louisiana 0.1 Louisiana 0.6
Kentucky -0.3 Montana 0.0
Illinois -0.3 Wyoming -0.4
Michigan -0.5 Kentucky -0.6
Wisconsin -0.5 Illinois -0.7
Indiana -0.9 Wisconsin -1.5
Montana -1.4 Michigan -1.7
Ohio
-1.5 Indiana -1.7
Nebraska -2.0 Nebraska -1.7
Wyoming -2.6 Ohio -22
Pennsyivania -2.7 North Dakota -2.9
North Dakota -4.7 Pennsylvania -3.2
West Virginia -7.2 West Virginia -6.1
Iowa -7.6 Iowa -6.6
Total U.S. 7.1 Total U.S. 5.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1 01 7, "Projections of
the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1988 to 2010," (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1989), Table F.
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TABLE 19. PROJECTIONS OF THE COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE,
FOR REGIONS AND DIVISIONS: 1990 TO 2000 AND 2000 TO 2010
(thousands)
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053,
"Projections of the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010,"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
higher. The West will continue to be the fastest growing region due to its
higher fertility rates and significant net in-migration. In addition, the West is
projected to attract a disproportionate share of immigrants, nearly twice as
many immigrants as any other single region. The South will benefit from
substantial in-migration, with over one-half of its total growth due to migra-
tion. The population of the Midwest is projected to decline, while the North-
east will register small population increases. These basic patterns are
expected to persist into the next century.
Of the ten fastest growing states in the next two decades, all but one will
be located in the South or West. These nine states will grow twice as fast as
the Nation as a whole. Arizona will be the fastest growing state in the
nineties, and the second fastest growing between 2000 and 2010. On the
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other end of the spectrum, 13 states will lose population, with Iowa and West
Virginia registering the greatest declines. While the states losing population
are located in several different Census divisions, they are all located in the
northern half of the country.
The age distribution of the population is of particular concern to military
manpower planners. Table 20 shows the projected population of 18 to 24 year
old males by region. During the first half of the decade, all regions are
expected to experience decreases in this age group. The effects of the "birth
dearth" will end in the second half of the 1990s and small increases will occur
in all regions. However, these changes during the 1990s will not be of the
same magnitude in all regions. Between 1990 and 1995 the Northeast and
Midwest will experience decreases of over 20 percent in the size of the youth
age group, whereas the South and West will see much smaller declines. While
only negligible increases will occur in the Northeast and Midwest between
1995 and 2000, the South and West will see a four and nine percent increase,
respectively, in their male youth populations. Between 2000 and 2005 all
regions will experience gains in the youth population, but between 2005 and
2010 this trend will reverse and all regions will experience a slow growth rate
in this age group.
TABLE 20. PROJECTED POPULATION OF 18 TO 24 YEAR OLD MALES (thousands)
1995 2000 2005 i?010
Region Number Growth (%)a Number Growth (%) Number Growth (%) Number Growth (%)
Northeast 2,157 -.24 2,163 .002 2,321 .07 2,346 .01
Midwest 2,711 -.20 2,746 .01 2,821 .03 2,818 .001
South 4,485 -.08 4,675 .04 5,005 .07 5,076 .01
West 5,305 -.03 5,806 .09 6,391 .10 6,452 .01
Notes: Growth rate in 1995 computed using 1986 as basis
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1053, "Projections of
the Population of States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1989 to 2010," (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990).
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IX. FORECASTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
While demographic changes are important, their effects on regional
recruiting are likely to be decidedly secondary in importance to economic
changes. Demographic trends are well understood and forecasts are fairly
reliable, but their effects are registered mostly in the long-term. In the
medium- to short-term, economic fluctuations dominate recruiting patterns.
Long-term trends in economic forces are also important: They provide some
clues to the nature of structural changes in a local economy based on its
industry mix. Long-run economic fluctuations have the greatest effect on
Reserve recruiting, and knowledge of these trends provide information on an
area's desirability for locating new Reserve units or relocating existing units.
Projections of a number of economic data series are available for regions
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the Department of Com-
merce 15 . The BEA methodology relies on two separate approaches to provide
consistency in the projections. First, long-term projections are developed of
population, labor force, employment, GNP, and GNP per employee at the
national level. Then, state-level 1995 projections for personal income by com-
ponent and employment and earnings by industry are made using an econo-
metric model. The projections from the econometric model for each state are
summed to obtain national totals, which are used to check the "top-down"
national projections for that year. State long-term projections are also made
using the "export base" approach, which relies on the relationship between
"basic" or export industries and "service" or local industries. State projections
beyond 2010 are available, but they are based on much simpler assumptions
and projection techniques.
Tables 21, 22, and 23 report some of the aggregate projections of
economic growth that are available from the BEA. Table 21 reports historical
data on the average annual growth rate of real (constant dollar) personal
15BEA also prepares projections to the year 2040 of population, personal income, earnings by
sector, and employment by sector for 336 metropolitan areas. Projections of the same vari-
ables are made for 183 BEA "economic areas." Each economic area consists of a metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) and the surrounding non-metropolitan counties that are economically
related to the central MSA. Commuting patterns are the key factor in constructing economic
areas (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990).
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TABLE 21. AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE IN PERSONAL INCOME BY
BEA REGION3 : HISTORICAL 1973-1988 AND 1988-2010 PROJECTIONS
(constant 1982 dollars)
1973- 1979- 1983- 1988- 1995- 2000- 2005-
BEA Region 1979 1983 1988 1995 2000 2005 2010
New England 1.74 2.44 5.85 1.78 1.60 1.32 1.14
Midwest 0.01 1.39 4.20 1.77 1.54 1.26 1.12
Great Lakes 2.02 -1.27 3.18 1.84 1.60 1.30 1.16
Plains 1.91 -0.01 2.79 2.12 1.72 1.38 1.22
Southeast 3.94 2.17 4.57 2.42 2.06 1.64 1.42
Southwest 6.19 3.56 2.09 2.41 2.06 1.62 1.36
Rocky Mountains 5.07 2.26 1.58 2.52 2.24 1.78 1.48
Far West 4.90 1.66 4.88 2.77 2.26 1.80 1.50
United States 2.90 1.24 3.90 2.19 1.87 1.51 1.31
Notes: aBEA Regions consist of the following states:
New England: CT, ME, MA, NH, Rl, VT
Mideast: DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA
Great Lakes: IL, IN, Ml, OH, Wl
Plains: IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD
Southeast: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, WA, WV
Southwest: AZ, NM, OK, TX
Rocky Mountain: CO, ID, MT, UT, WY
Far West: CA, NV, OR, WA
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Regional Projections
to 2040, Vol. 1: States," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
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TABLE 22. AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY BEA
REGION: HISTORICAL 1973-1988 AND 1988-2010 PROJECTIONS
1973- 1979- 1983- 1988- 1995- 2000- 2005-
BEA Region 1979 1983 1988 1995 2000 2005 2010
New England 2.06 1.13 3.88 1.06 0.91 0.54 0.25
Midwest 0.79 0.34 2.88 0.96 0.80 0.44 0.17
Great Lakes 1.64 -1.55 3.04 1.03 0.86 0.50 0.23
Plains 2.56 -0.25 2.45 1.03 0.84 0.47 0.21
Southeast 2.63 1.06 3.82 1.28 1.07 0.65 0.35
Southwest 4.71 2.77 1.95 1.31 1.11 0.66 0.34
Rocky Mountains 4.90 1.64 1.93 1.43 1.26 0.79 0.44
Far West 4.73 1.21 4.23 1.81 1.43 0.92 0.53
United States 2.54 0.56 3.21 1.24 1.03 0.62 0.32
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Regional Projections
to 2040, Vol. 1: States," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
TABLE 23. PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME BY BEA REGIONS: 1988-2010
(constant 1982 dollars)
BEA Regions 1988a 1995 2000 2005 2010
New England $16,205 $17,319 $18,154 $18,825 $19,405
Midwest 15,239 16,545 17,477 18,237 18,897
Great Lakes 13,042 14,245 15,098 15,798 16,413
Plains 12,362 13,670 14,562 15,297 15,931
Southeast 11,614 12,832 13,691 14,399 15,014
Southwest 11,527 12,748 13,633 14,374 15,023
Rocky Mountains 11,531 12,717 13,577 14,296 14,929
Far West 14,575 15,752 16,622 17,339 17,967
United States 13,245 14,469 15,345 16,065 16,693
Notes: a 1 988 represents actual data.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 'Regional Projections
to 2040, Vol. 1: States," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
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income and the projected annual growth rate for various periods by BEA
region. Note that there are eight BEA regions, which are defined differently
from Census regions; States contained in each BEA region are listed in the
note to Table 21. Table 22 reports historical data on the average annual
growth rate of total employment and projected rates by BEA region. Table 23
provides forecast values of real per capita personal income by BEA region. 16
The historical data in Tables 21 and 22 highlight some of the economic
changes that have occurred in the U.S. in the last decade or so. Personal
income and employment growth were both fairly robust in the 1970s, growing
at roughly 2.5-3.0 percent annually. This growth was curtailed in the early
1980s with the national recession: Nationwide employment growth came to a
stop during the 1979-1983 period, while increases in personal income slowed
to a rate of only one percent per year. States in the Great Lakes and Plains
regions were especially hard hit in the early 1980s downturn, with decreases
in both employment and personal income. Employment growth in the Mideast
during this period was also stagnant. The 1983-1988 period witnessed the
recovery of employment growth in all regions, although it was particularly
rapid in New England, the Southeast, and the Far West.
The projections reveal that, nationwide, employment and personal
income growth in the first half of the 1990s will not be as rapid as during the
latter part of the 1980s. The growth rate of employment will be only about
one-third of what it was during the late 1980s. Personal income growth will
also slow, but not as sharply. After 1995, using these indicators, economic
growth will continue to decelerate through the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury. Essentially the models predict very slow employment growth and mod-
erate personal income growth from 1995 to 2010.
While all states will share in the national slowdown in employment
growth, some states will outperform the others. In general, the BEA regions
located in the southern and western portions of the nation will grow faster
than those in the other regions. While New England and the Mideast will
experience zero employment growth during the next two decades, moderate
16Projections of national labor force, economic growth, and employment growthalso are pro-
duced by the BEA methodology. In addition, national projections are produced by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (1989). The regional projections presented here are consistent with the
national projections from the BLS.
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growth will be registered in the other BEA regions through the year 2000.
After 2000, however, all regions will experience slow growth of employment
and personal income, providing fairly pessimistic scenarios for the first
decade of the 21st century.
Table 23 provides actual data on real per capita income for 1988 and
projected values for 1995 through 2010 by BEA region. This indicator takes
into account population growth and is conventionally viewed as a gauge of
overall economic well-being. Changes in this variable for the nation reflect
those in the previous two tables: Moderate growth throughout the 1990s, with
annual growth rates around one percent, then slow growth in the first decade
of the 21st century, with annual growth rates below one percent. Thus, while
real economic growth will expand, it will do so at a decreasing pace.
The potential impact of these projections on Army recruiting is not
clearcut. The worst recruitment period in the history of the AVF was the late
1970s when employment growth was rapid. On the other hand, one of the
best recruitment periods was the mid- to late- 1980s, which also was a period
of rapid economic expansion and employment growth. Yet the turnaround in
recruitment from the bleak period of the late 1970s to the successes of the
mid- to late- 1980s occurred during the recession of the early 1980s when
employment growth was slow nationwide and negative in some regions. Of
course, this period coincided with major military pay increases in 1981 and
1982, but economic conditions clearly played a role. As evidence of the impor-
tance of economic conditions, even though recruiting during the late 1980s
was robust in most regions, chronic shortfalls bedeviled New England where
the expansion of employment exceeded the national average.
The projections for employment and economic growth will slow through-
out the 1990s, and by 2000 conditions will begin to resemble those of the
recessionary period of the early eighties. The limited historical evidence sug-
gests that, as a result of these forecasted changes, recruitment conditions will
improve steadily throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st
century. Economic and employment growth consistently will fall below the
national average in the BEA regions ofNew England, the Mideast, the Great
Lakes, and the Plains; growth will exceed the national average in BEA
regions located in the south and west.
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X. IMMIGRATION
Historically, the years of heaviest U.S. immigration were early in this
century, when the annual gross flows exceeded one million during 6 different
years and peaked at 1.3 million in 1907. Between 1901 and 1910, 8.8 million
immigrants were admitted to the U.S. (Table 24), which is a figure unrivaled
in the nation's history. During the 1970s immigration surged to levels unseen
since the early years of the century, as 4.5 million persons were admitted
between 1971 and 1980. The only previous periods with higher totals were
1901-10, 1911-20 (5.7 million), and 1881-90 (5.2 million) (Table 24). Rela-
tive to the 1970s, immigration grew even stronger during the 1980s. The
1,090,924 persons admitted during 1989 was the highest total since 1924 and
the fifth highest total in the nation's history. 17 Between 1981 and 1989 5.8
million legal immigrants were admitted for permanent residence in the U.S.
If one adds the estimated 2.4 million undocumented aliens who entered dur-
ing the 1980s, the decade of the eighties rivals the previous peak decade for
total immigration volume.
The 1980 census recorded 5.6 million residents who immigrated to the
U.S. between 1970 and 1980. 18 During this decade the foreign-born popula-
tion grew by 5.4 million, which was the largest intercensal increase in U.S.
history, representing 23.2 percent of the increment in population (Table 25).
If illegal immigration during the 1970s contributed 2.0 million additional per-
sons who were not enumerated in the 1980 census, immigration accounted for
25 percent of the increment in U.S. population. Thus, gross U.S. immigration,
net immigration, and net immigration's contribution to population growth
have in recent years been at or near historic high levels. 19
17Of the 1,090,924 persons admitted in 1989, 478,814 gained admission under the
legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
18The difference between the 5.6 million figure reported here and the 4.5 million figure
reported in Table 1 is that the latter number refers to persons legally admitted between 1971
and 1980, whereas the former number refers to all 1970-1980 immigrants, including illegal
aliens, who were counted in the 1980 census.
19As a fraction of U.S. population, however, immigration was far higher during the first
decade of the twentieth century (10.5 immigrants per 1,000 population) than during the
1970s (2.1 immigrants per 1,000 population) (Table 2).
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TABLE 24. IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, BY DECADE, 1821-1988


















Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1988, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, Table 1












1851-60 31.4 4.1 2.6 9.3
1861-70 39.8 5.5 2.3 6.5
1871-60 50.2 6.6 2.8 6.2
1881-90 62.9 9.1 5.2 9.2
1891-1900 76.0 10.2 3.7 5.3
1901-10 92.0 13.3 8.8 10.5
1911-20 105.7 13.7 5.7 5.8
1921-30 122.8 14.0 4.1 3.6
1931-40 131.7 11.4 0.5 0.4
1941-50 150.7 10.2 1.0 0.7
1951-60 179.3 9.3 2.5 1.5
1961-70 203.2 8.7 3.3 1.7
1971-80 226.5 14.1 4.5 2.1
1981-90 249.6 — 5.9 2.5
aComputed relative to the average population over a decade.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970,
Bicentennial Edition Part 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
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Even though the proportion of the change in U.S. population accounted
for by immigration rose steadily in the last five decades, immigrants' share of
the change in the labor force actually fell until the 1980s (Table 26). This drop
was due to the increase in labor force participation rates by women and the
inflow of the baby boom cohort into the labor market during this period. In
addition, many immigrants entered the U.S. for family unification reasons
rather than to obtain employment. However, this situation changed in the
1980s with the increased flow ofimmigrants. During the eighties, the share of
both population growth and labor force growth consisting of immigrants
reached post-war highs of 26.8 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively (Table
26). If illegal flows are included, immigrants accounted for almost 40 percent
of population growth and one-fourth of labor force growth.
TABLE 26. FLOWS OF IMMIGRANTS RELATIVE TO THE POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE
Immigrant Flow Share of Chanae:
























Source: J. Abowd and R. Freeman, "The Internationalization of the U.S. Labor Market,"
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990), Table 1.
Not only did the volume of U.S. immigration increase appreciably dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, but also the source-country composition of immigra-
tion changed dramatically as immigrant origins shifted away from Europe
and toward North America, Central America, and Asia. Of the 53.1 million
immigrants admitted to the U.S. between 1820 and 1986, 69.2 percent came
from Europe. As shown in Table 27, the dominance of Europe as a source of
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U.S. immigrants has been gradually eroding for some time, but after the pro-
visions of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
became fully effective in 1968, this dominance eroded significantly. During
the 1980s, Europe was the source of only 11.5 percent of the immigrants
legally admitted to the U.S., whereas Asia was the source of 45.0 percent and
America the source of 40.2 percent of them.
Clearly, immigration had again become an important source of U.S.
population growth. What has been unique about contemporary immigration is
that the international migrants have crossed the nation's southern and west-
ern borders and settled in relatively large numbers in the South and West.
Prior immigration waves were across the eastern border. Of the 5.6 million
1970-1980 immigrants, 3.4 million, or 61 percent, resided in the South and
West in 1980, when these regions held 52 percent of national population.20
A. REGIONAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS OF IMMIGRANTS
Using data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses, Table 28 reports the dis-
tribution of the stock of immigrants for U.S. states, computed as a percent of
the labor force. Column 3 applies a state-by-state adjustment factor for the
likely undercount of illegal immigrants in the Census.21 This table demon-
strates that there is considerable diffusion of the stock of immigrants among
states. As Table 29 shows, however, there is considerably less diffusion of the
stock of immigrants among major metropolitan areas. Immigrants tend to
account for a higher percent of the labor force in a small number of SMSAs.
Geographic concentration is greater for the flow of new immigrants than
it is for the existing stock of immigrants. Table 30 shows the number of new
immigrants from 1976 to 1979 who declared each of several selected SMSAs
as their intended residence. The table also calculates the contribution of the
flow of new immigrants as a percentage of the labor force growth in each
SMSA. While these are selected "gateway" cities, the extent of geographic
concentration is striking. These few SMSAs absorbed a significant percentage
of all new immigrants during this period. Also, these data are not adjusted for
20U.S. Bureau of the Census (1981), Table 312.
21See Passel and Woodrw (1984) for a discussion of this adjustment factor.
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TABLE 28. IMMIGRANT PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE BY STATES, 1970 AND 1980
Adj.
State 1970 1980 1980a
Alabama 0.7% 1.1% 1.2%
Alaska 5.9 4.7 4.9
Arizona 5.4 6.1 6.9
Arkansas 0.5 1.1 1.2
California 11.4 16.3 19.3
Colorado 3.8 4.0 4.5
Connecticut 10.6 8.9 9.0
Delaware 2.7 3.1 3.2
District of Columbia 8.0 6.9 8.7
Florida 10.0 11.5 12.2
Georgia 1.2 1.9 2.1
Hawaii 11.4 15.3 15.2
Idaho 1.8 3.0 3.5
Illinois 7.3 8.0 8.9
Indiana 2.2 1.9 2.0
Iowa 1.8 1.5 1.6
Kansas 1.3 2.1 2.3
Kentucky 0.2 0.9 1.1
Louisiana 1.4 2.3 2.4
Maine 5.8 3.5 3.4
Maryland 4.4 5.0 5.7
Massachusetts 10.6 8.5 8.8
Michigan 6.7 4.3 4.4
Minnesota 3.1 2.3 2.4
Mississippi 0.2 1.0 1.1
Missouri 1.8 1.8 1.9
Montana 1.6 2.2 2.2
Nebraska 1.4 1.9 2.1
Nevada 6.2 7.9 8.6
New Hampshire 5.1 4.3 4.3
New Jersey 10.6 11.2 11.6
New Mexico 3.3 4.1 4.9
New York 13.9 14.8 15.8
North Carolina 0.8 1.4 1.5
North Dakota 2.7 2.0 2.1
Ohio 3.5 2.7 2.8
Oklahoma 1.1 2.0 2.3
Oregon 4.4 4.1 4.5
Pennsylvania 4.1 3.1 3.1
Rhode Island 8.8 8.8 9.0
South Carolina 0.7 1.6 1.7
South Dakota 1.2 1.3 1.3
Tennessee 1.1 1.2 1.3
Texas 3.5 6.5 7.6
Utah 2.9 4.0 4.5
Vermont 7.4 4.5 4.5
Washington 5.9 6.1 6.5
West Virginia 1.2 1.1 1.1
Wisconsin 3.3 2.5 2.6
Wyoming 1.6 1.9 2.1
aThe adjustment is based on Passell and Woodrow (1984), Table 1, "Estimates of Undocumented Aliens
Counted in the 1980 Census and Legally Resident Aliens by State of Residence and Period of Entry."
Source: J. Abowd and R. Freeman, "The Internationalization of the U.S. Labor Market," Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.
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Dallas-Fort Worth 2.4 4.8
Detroit 8.4 6.3
Houston 3.3 8.3
Los Angeles 13.6 24.2
Miami 27.9 41.2
New York City 18.0 24.0
Philadelphia 6.1 5.0
Pittsburgh 4.3 2.7
St. Louis 2.3 2.3
San Francisco 13.7 16.2
Washington, DC 6.0 9.0
Notes: The numerator is the number of immigrants in the labor force in the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area indicated. The denominator is the number of individuals in the labor force in the
SMSA. SMSA definitions in the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Population were made comparable by
selecting the appropriate area and subarea codes (1970) and SMSA codes (1980).
Sources: Based on individual data from the 1970 Census of Population and Housing 1/100 Public Use
County Group Sample and the 1980 Census of Population and Housing Public Use Microdata A-
sample. (From Abowd and Freeman, 1990.)
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SMSA Place of Residence3 1976 to 1979° Labor Force Growth
Miami 79,099 54,233 73.3%
Los Angeles 74,515 254,000 14.7
New York City 247,052 38,000 326.8
El Paso 13,053 8,836 74.3
Newark 8,879 40,738 11.0
Washington, DC 8,359 166,193 2.5
Houston 23,868 255,367 4.7
Cleveland 3,800 38,108 5.0
Philadelphia 10,571 85,016 6.3
Dallas 10,735 220,331 2.4
Notes: aNumber of immigrants who declared the SMSA as the intended place of permanent residence
during the period from October 1, 1975 to September 30, 1979. SMSAs are listed in descending
order of percent foreign born in the area.
^Change in the size of the labor force from 1976 to 1979, inclusive.
cEstimated as 50.3 percent of column one divided by column two.
Sources: Number of immigrants from the Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
1976 to 1979. Change in the labor force from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Area Statistics,
Employment and Earnings various issues. The immigrant labor force to immigrant population ratio
was estimated from the 1980 Census of Population Detailed Population Characteristics U.S.
Summary Section A-U.S. PC80-D1-A. (From Abowd and Freeman, 1990.)
illegal flows, which as Table 28 reported, would likely increase the shares for
cities in California, Florida, New York, and Texas.
Bartel (1989) analyzed the 1980 geographic distribution of male immi-
grants aged 25-54 who arrived in the U.S. between 1975 and 1979. She found
that the new male immigrants were much more likely than natives to be con-
centrated in the 25 largest SMSAs: While three-fourths of the new immi-
grants resided there, only one-half of the native population lived in these
SMSAs. Of the major separate ethnic groups, Hispanic males were the most
geographically concentrated: 81.4 percent were located in the top 25 largest
SMSAs. Moreover, Bartel found that ethnic immigrants were more likely to
be located in SMSAs in which high percentages of the relevant ethnic group
already lived. Bartel tracked three cohorts after their arrival in the U.S. and
found that over time the patterns of geographic concentration remained fairly
stable.
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Another noteworthy finding in the Bartel study is that immigrants had
higher internal migration rates (between 1975 and 1979) than natives of the
same ethnicity and with the same education. Asians were the most mobile of
the ethnic groups, followed by Hispanics and Europeans. Immigrants who
initially settled elsewhere were more likely to move to the largest SMSAs,
probably in an attempt to link up with their fellow countrymen. By sharp
contrast, natives were more likely to leave the 25 largest SMSAs.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. IMMIGRANTS, 1980
By 1980 the U.S. foreign-born population from North and Central Amer-
ica almost equaled that from Europe (Table 31). While the foreign stock from
Europe declined by 0.5 million over the decade of the 1970s, that from North
and Central America increased sharply. Almost 2.2 million persons were
recorded as 1970-80 immigrants from this region, about 1.3 million from
Mexico and 0.5 million from the West Indies, including Cuba. Due to the 1965
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, the foreign-born popu-
lation from Asia also increased significantly.22 In 1980 almost 1.8 million U.S.
residents were recorded as 1970-80 immigrants from Asia, mostly from the
Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam.
A considerable difference exists in the educational composition of immi-
grant flows from North and Central America compared to Asia. As Table 32
shows, among 1970-80 immigrants 25 years old and over, 6.9 percent from
North and Central America had at least 4 years of college compared to 37.4
percent from Asia. In general, 22.2 percent of the immigrants had 4 or more
years of college compared to 16.3 percent of 1980 U.S. natives. At the other
extreme, 12.8 percent of the immigrants compared to 2.9 percent of the
natives had less than 5 years of elementary school. Again, distinct differences
characterize Asian countries (average 7.4 percent) relative to North and Cen-
tral American countries (average 21.7 percent).
22Prior to the 1965 Amendments, immigration was largely determined by the "national
origins" quota system that severely restricted immigration from Asian countries. Under the
1965 Amendments, which became effective after a three-year transition period, these
restrictions were relaxed, so that Asians are now able to compete for U.S. immigrant status
on a more equal basis with potential migrants from other nations. For more details
concerning immigration law, as well as a discussion of recently proposed changes in U.S.
immigration law, see Briggs (1984) and Greenwood and McDowell (1985).
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TABLE 31. SOURCII REGION AND SOURCE COUNTRY COMPOSITION OF 1980
FOREIGN BORN U.S. POPULATION: SELECTED MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS
(in thousands)
Pre-1970 Immigrants 1970-80 limmigrants
Among 1980 Stock Among 1980 Stock
1980 Percent Percent
Region/Country Stock Number Distrib. Number Distrib.
Total3 14,080 8,520 5,560
From Europe 4,744 4,002 (47.8%) 742 (13.3%)
U.K. and Ireland 867 721 (8.5) 146 (2.6)
Germany 849 759 (8-9) 90 (16)
Italy 832 732 (8.6) 100 (1.8)
From North and Central America 4,665 2,512 (29.5) 2,153 (38.7)
Mexico 2,199 929 (10.9) 1,270 (22.8)
Canada 843 715 (8.4) 128 (2.3)
West Indies less Cuba 651 277 (3.3) 374 (6-7)
Cuba 608 445 (52) 163 (2.9)
El Salvadore 94 21 (0.2) 73 (13)
From Asia 2,540 777 (9.1) 1,763 (31.7)
Philippines 501 182 (2.1) 319 (5.7)
Korea 290 47 (0.6) 243 (4.4)
China 286 150 (18) 136 (2.4)
Vietnam 231 5 (0.1) 226 (4.1)
Japan 222 122 (1.4) 100 (18)
Iran 122 19 (0.2) 103 (1.9)
From South America 561 245 (2.9) 316 (5.7)
Colombia 144 65 (0.8) 79 (1.4)
From U.S.S.R. 406 308 (3.6) 98 (1.8)
From Africa 200 70 (0.8) 130 (2.3)
aThe discrepancy between the U.S. total and the sum of the major components is all other
countries and country not reported. Of 1970-80 immigrants, 5.7 percent failed to report a
country.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population. General Social and
Economic Characteristics. Part 1. United States Summary, PC80-1-C1. U.S.
Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1984, Table 254.
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TABLE 32. EDUCATION, ENGLISH LANGUAGE SKILLS, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
RATES OF 1970-1980 U.S. IMMIGRANTS FROM SELECTED
COUNTRIES: 1980
Reqion/Country A B C D E
Europe 20.4% 11.7% 76.3% 32.1% 6.7%
Greece 10.6 9.9 65.5 35.7 7.6
Italy 8.3 17.7 63.2 38.6 9.1
U.K. 30.5 0.8 99.6 5.2 4.3
Asia 37.4 7.4 74.8 27.3 6.2
China 27.6 15.8 49.0 51.8 4.3
India 63.1 2.8 91.3 9.7 6.2
Korea 31.6 4.2 69.3 34.7 6.1
Philippines 47.9 5.8 91.2 9.8 4.7
Vietnam 11.9 10.4 58.6 43.6 8.2
North and Central America 6.9 21.7 52.3 56.8 9.7
Canada 30.0 0.9 98.6 6.0 4.4
Cuba 10.3 11.4 45.3 55.6 8.4
Dominican Republic 3.4 21.3 40.1 60.9 12.3
Haiti 9.5 10.9 70.7 30.5 13.3
Jamaica 9.7 4.0 99.4 9.6 8.8
Mexico 2.7 32.9 39.5 61.5 10.3
South America 18.3 4.5 70.1 35.2 8.0
Africa 43.3 2.7 91.4 10.8 8.0
Foreign-Born Immigrants: 1970-80 22.2 12.8 66.1 40.4 8.1
Foreign-Born Immigrants: Prior to 1970 13.2 11.1 86.3 22.2 5.8
Natives 16.3 2.9 99.4 9.4 6.5
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1 , Characteristics of
the Population, Chapter D, Detailed Population Characteristics; Part 1 , United States
Summary, PC80-1-D1-A, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1984,
Table 255.
A: Percent of persons 25 years old and over with 4 or more years of college.
B: Percent of persons 25 years old and over with less than 5 years of elementary school.
C: Percent of persons 5 years old and over who either spoke only English at home, or if they
spoke a language other than English at home, claimed to speak English "well" or "very well."
D: Percent of persons 5 years old and over who spoke a language other than English at home
who claimed to speak English "not well" or "not at all."
E: 1980 unemployment rate of persons 16 years old and over.
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The combination of education and English language skills importantly
determines the ease with which an immigrant is assimilated into the U.S.
economy. Differences between source regions in immigrant educational com-
position are also reflected in English language proficiency. Among 1970-80
immigrants 18 years old and over, 36.1 percent of those from North and Cen-
tral America claimed to speak English either "well" or "very well" (as opposed
to "not well" or "not at all") in 1980, compared to 72.7 percent of the Asian
immigrants.
C. IMMIGRANTS COMPARED TO NATIVES, 1 980
Differences in age and educational composition, combined with less than
perfect transferability of skills to the U.S. labor market, contribute to an oc-
cupational distribution of recent immigrants that is somewhat more oriented
toward less-skilled occupations, as shown in Table 33. The U.S. work force as
a whole is considerably more concentrated in managerial and professional
and in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations than is the
new immigrant population, whereas the immigrants are more concentrated in
service and in operator, fabricator, and laborer occupations. Immigrants who
have been in the U.S. for a longer period have an occupational distribution
that is similar to that for all U.S. workers (Table 33), which suggests either
that the older immigrants had a different initial bundle of skills or that over
time they were assimilated into the U.S. economy. Partially as a consequence
of their concentration in less-skilled occupations, their relatively young age,
and their inability to adapt immediately to the U.S. work force, the recent
immigrants have higher unemployment rates than the U.S. labor force (8.1
percent compared to 6.5 percent in 1980) and somewhat lower family median
income ($18,626 versus $23,092 in 1979).23
23As is true of migrants in general, the new immigrants tend to be relatively young, with a
substantial concentration in the ages 20 to 49. Consequently, immigrants aged 16 and over
tend to have a higher labor force participation rate than the corresponding population as a
whole (64.4 percent in 1980 for 1970-80 immigrants compared to 62.0 percent in 1980 for the
U.S.).
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TABLE 33. 1980 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL U.S. WORKERS, PRE-1970









Specialty 22.7% 23.4% 17.7%
Technical, Sales and
Administrative Support 30.3 26.9 21.0
Service 12.9 14.8 18.0
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing 2.9 2.6 4.1
Precision Production, Craft
and Repair 12.9 13.7 11.8
Operators, Fabricators,
and Laborers 18.3 18.7 27.3
All Occupations 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Workers (thousands) 97,639 3,991 2,541
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population. Detailed Population
Characteristics. Part 1. United States Summary, PC80-1-D1-A. U.S. Government
Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1984, Table 255.
Two other comparisons between immigrants and natives are particularly
relevant in the context of this study, namely, gender and age. The 1980 cen-
sus also allows a detailed comparison between various cohorts of immigrants
(e.g., 1970-80 and before 1970) and natives by these characteristics. Table 34
reports gender differences and Table 35 reports differences in the age distri-
butions of the various populations.
With regard to gender, the most notable observation in Table 34 is that
the foreign born who entered the U.S. prior to 1970 have a higher concentra-
tion of women than those who entered between 1970 and 1980. Moreover, the
older immigrant entry cohort also has a substantially higher concentration of
women than the non-foreign born (55.7 percent compared to 51.3 percent).
The difference in the gender composition between natives and those immi-
grants who entered before 1970 appears to be due mainly to two factors:
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TABLE 34. GENDER COMPOSITION OF U.S. NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATIONS: 1980
Males Females
All Persons 48.6% 51.4%
Non-Foreign Born 48.7 51.3
Foreign Born
Entered Before 1970 44.3 55.7
Foreign Born
Entered 1970-80 50.4 49.6
Source: Calculated from data presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census. Detailed Characteristics,
United States Summary Section A: United States, PC80-1-D1-A (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1984), Table 255.






Under 14 years 23.5% 1.4% 20.2%
15 to 19 years 9.6 3.6 10.1
20 to 24 9.5 4.9 14.1
25 to 34 16.3 12.3 28.6
35 to 44 11.1 15.8 13.6
45 to 54 9.9 15.2 6.5
55 to 64 9.6 13.8 3.7
65 years and over 10.6 32.9 3.2
All Persons 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from data presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census. Detailed Population
Characteristics, United States Summary Section A: United States, PC80-1-D1-A
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Table 255.
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(1) older immigrant cohorts from the more recent past were composed of
relatively high percentages of women, and (2) greater female life expectancy
among older immigrant cohorts from the more distant past.
The age distribution of the foreign born who entered before 1970 differs
considerably from that entering between 1970 and 1980, and each in turn dif-
fers considerably from the distribution of natives (Table 35). First, the foreign
born who entered before 1970 of course had no one aged to 9 in 1980. The
1.4 percent contribution of those under 14 years of age is entirely due to
persons 10 to 14. Almost one-third of the older entry cohort is made up of
persons 65 years of age and over, which importantly reflects the aging of
immigrants who came to the U.S. before entry barriers were erected in 1924.
Among the 1970-80 immigrant cohort, the relatively high concentration of
persons 20 to 34 years old (42.7 percent compared to 27.4 percent for natives)
reflects the relative high migration propensities of persons of this general age
and also reflects the job-seeking behavior of this group. Finally, the concen-
tration of older persons in the 1970-80 cohort is substantially less than for
natives (6.9 percent 55 years older and over compared to 20.2 for natives).
D. ANNUAL CHANGES IN IMMIGRANT GENDER, AGE, AND SKILL
COMPOSITION, 1972-1986
The immigration patterns described above were based primarily on 1980
census data. Consequently, with the possible exception of examining specific
entry cohorts of immigrants, changes over time in the various patterns could
not be traced in any detail. In this section of the paper, we use Immigration
and Naturalization Service data to examine the changing gender, age, and
skill composition of U.S. immigrants over the 1972-1986 period.
For some years the gender composition of legal U.S. immigration has
been shifting away from women and toward men. In 1976 46.4 percent of U.S.
immigrants were male, but 12 years later 50.0 percent were male (Table 36).
The shift in gender composition was coincident with a shift in the age compo-
sition of both male and female immigrants. The percentage of males 20 to 49
years of age increased from 54.6 percent in 1970 to 60.9 percent in 1988
(Table 37). Between 1970 and 1988, the percentage of males who were chil-
dren 9 years old and less fell considerably from 19.0 percent to 10.8 percent,
whereas the percentage 50 and over increased modestly from 8.0 percent to
12.1 percent.
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TABLE 36. GENDER COMPOSITION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION: 1970-1988
Percent Male Percent Female






















aFigure is drawn from the INS Microdata Tapes and does not include refugees.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, various years.
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TABLE 37. AGE COMPOSITION OF MALE IMMIGRANTS TO THE U.S.: 1970-1980
(in percent)
Year under 5 5-9 10-19 20-29 30-39
1970 9.08% 9.94% 18.46% 24.49% 20.13%
1971 8.80 10.06 18.58 25.63 19.87
1972 8.67 9.69 18.24 27.54 19.42
1973 8.70 9.57 19.58 27.96 17.69
1974 8.44 9.62 20.84 28.12 17.22
1975 8.22 9.16 20.35 27.51 17.47
1976 7.86 8.56 19.09 28.21 17.81
1977 6.47 7.58 19.23 26.53 18.03
1978 6.10 9.30 20.04 27.33 18.88
1979 6.43 8.22 19.27 28.55 18.68
1980 na na na 30.8a 19.4a
1981 na na na 26.2a 20.1 a
1982 5.92 8.38 20.19 30.02 18.22
1983 5.84 7.53 18.86 31.70 19.24
1984 5.73 7.03 18.55 31.26 19.75
1985 5.59 6.78 17.73 31.38 20.30
1986 5.53 6.80 17.63 29.44 21.02
1987 5.35 6.39 17.30 28.67 21.33
1988 4.73 6.03 16.26 26.89 22.52
Year 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+
1970 9.93% 4.64% 2.44% 0.73% 0.15%
1971 8.84 4.55 2.67 0.85 0.17
1972 8.35 4.21 2.68 0.98 0.22
1973 8.16 4.32 2.80 1.00 0.21
1974 7.76 4.12 2.70 0.98 0.20
1975 8.31 4.64 3.04 1.09 0.22
1976 8.20 5.02 3.57 1.37 0.29
1977 9.44 6.01 4.27 1.97 0.48
1978 8.90 4.92 3.08 1.21 0.26
1979 8.44 5.12 3.58 1.47 0.24
1980 7.3a 4.3a 3.3a na na
1981 8.3a 4.6a 3.4a na na
1982 7.96 4.55 3.18 1.33 0.25
1983 7.89 4.45 3.07 1.20 0.23
1984 8.18 4.76 3.26 1.25 0.22
1985 8.36 4.81 3.44 1.36 0.24
1986 8.72 5.23 3.80 1.51 0.32
1987 9.66 5.61 3.94 1.44 0.29
1988 11.48 6.33 4.05 1.41 0.32
na = Not available.
aFigure is drawn from the INS Microdata Tapes and does not include refugees.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, various years.
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While males 20 to 49 were increasing as a fraction of total male immi-
gration, women in the same age class were decreasing relatively (Table 38).
The fraction of female immigrants accounted for by this age group decreased
from 61.2 percent in 1972 to 58.4 percent in 1988. The decrease for women
20-29 was particularly high—from 37.0 percent in 1972 to 27.3 percent in
1988. Female immigrants 50 and over increased from 9.2 percent 1970 to 15.2
percent in 1988.
Table 39 reports four broad occupational categories for immigrants who
were not refugees. Occupation not reported includes persons under 16 years
of age, as well as persons who had no occupation or chose to report none.
These data are also from the INS Public Use Tapes. The years 1980-1983 are
not absolutely comparable with other years due to missing information.
Nevertheless, some general trends are apparent in the data. The fraction of
immigrants who claimed to be professional, technical, and kindred workers
has declined, whereas those who are managers and proprietors (except farm)
has increased. The fraction who are craftspersons has also declined. Those
who are laborers has increased. In general, a slight shift appears to have
occurred from the more skilled to the less skilled occupations.
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TABLE 38. AGE COMPOSITION OF FEMALE IMMIGRANTS TO THE U.S.: 1970-1980
(in percent)
Year under 5 5-9 10-19 20-29 30-39
1970 7.96% 8.70% 18.25% 33.67% 16.67%
1971 7.56 8.53 17.95 35.81 16.58
1972 7.61 8.24 17.42 37.02 16.15
1973 7.85 8.18 18.36 36.35 15.32
1974 7.55 8.27 19.24 35.71 15.32
1975 7.42 7.97 18.50 34.61 15.56
1976 7.12 7.30 17.28 36.21 15.50
1977 5.96 6.17 17.24 32.17 16.44
1978 5.66 8.00 18.10 32.45 17.42
1979 5.91 7.26 18.05 32.27 17.31
1980 na na na 31 .7a 17.4a
1981 na na na 28.8a 18.3a
1982 6.03 7.80 18.60 28.63 17.18
1983 6.34 7.14 17.98 28.79 17.96
1984 6.19 6.77 17.70 28.40 18.37
1985 5.94 6.46 16.88 29.77 18.47
1986 5.69 6.40 16.75 28.72 18.88
1987 5.54 6.08 16.41 28.55 19.33
1988 4.94 5.85 15.58 27.27 20.38
Year 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+
1970 8.85% 4.89% 3.06% 1.03% 0.23%
1971 6.3/ 5.14 1.17 0.25
1972 8.04 4.99 3.44 1.36 0.30
1973 7.97 5.38 3.59 1.35 0.31
1974 7.83 5.19 3.65 1.31 0.31
1975 8.18 5.86 4.18 1.55 0.34
1976 7.98 6.39 4.83 1.86 0.41
1977 9.38 7.30 5.90 2.58 0.67
1978 8.65 6.21 4.28 1.72 0.46
1979 8.75 6.66 4.73 1.41 0.38
1980 7.7a 6.2a 4.5a na na
1981 8.1 a 6.1 a 4.3a na na
1982 8.21 6.30 4.60 1.92 0.40
1983 8.39 6.39 4.28 1.62 0.36
1984 8.70 6.72 4.51 1.72 0.31
1985 8.49 6.76 4.74 1.85 0.41
1986 8.74 7.13 5.22 2.04 0.44
1987 9.47 7.26 5.13 1.85 0.38
1988 10.73 7.60 5.26 1.92 0.46
na = Not available.
aFigure is drawn from the INS Microdata Tapes and does not include refugees.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, various years.
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TABLE 39. PERCENTAGE OF NONREFUGEES IN VARIOUS SKILL CLASSES AND













1972 13.4 2.0 12.4 12.5 59.7
1973 10.7 2.3 12.6 12.5 61.8
1974 9.3 2.4 13.0 13.0 62.3
1975 10.4 2.7 14.6 10.3 62.0
1976 10.7 3.0 14.3 9.9 62.1
1977 10.8 4.1 15.9 9.9 59.3
1978 8.8 4.0 16.8 11.9 58.5
1979 8.6 4.2 16.2 10.9 60.2
1980a 7.5 3.6 13.7 8.9 48.9
1981 a 6.8 3.4 15.4 10.4 51.3
1982 a 9.4 4.3 14.5 11.0 55.9
1983 a 8.1 4.2 10.4 17.5 54.9
1984 8.0 4.3 10.4 17.9 59.3
1985 8.4 4.2 10.7 17.8 59.0
1986 8.0 4.1 10.0 17.8 60.1
Percentages for 1980-83 do not add to 100.0 due to missing occupational information on
individual records.
Source: INS Public Use Tapes.
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XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to report on regional population trends and
projections, and on trends in immigration for the U.S. The following points
summarize some of the salient facts presented above:
1. The mobility of the population, including the youth population, has
decreased in recent years;
2. Net migration rates are expected to slow even further in the next
two decades;
3. Population and employment shifts to the South and West will slow
in future decades compared to the last two decades;
4. Despite this slowdown, in the next two decades over 90 percent of
the net increase in population still will occur in the South and West;
5. Over one-half of the growth in the South will be due to migration,
whereas a disproportionate share of growth in the West will be
accounted for by immigrants;
6. Because population shifts and changes in employment growth are
interdependent, regions experiencing the most rapid population
growth will also tend to experience the most rapid economic growth;
7. The proportion of the population aged 18-24 will drop until 1995,
then grow slowly afterward; however, growth of this age group will
be more rapid in the South and West regions;
8. Nationwide, economic and employment growth rates will remain
fairly high until 1995 when they will begin a steady decline until
2010. Employment growth after 2000 will slow considerably.
9. Regions in the Rustbelt will experience rates of employment and
economic growth that fall below the national average, while regions
in the Sunbelt will experience above-average growth.
10. In the 1980s, legal immigration accounted for nearly 27 percent of
the increase in the U.S. population and 16 percent of the increase in
the labor force; if illegal immigrants are counted, these percentages
are 38 and 23, respectively;
11. New immigrants tend to be more geographically concentrated than
natives; three-fourths of new immigrants lived in the 25 largest
SMSAs in 1980, whereas only one-half of natives lived in these
SMSAs.
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12. Because of slow rates of natural population increase, aging of the
U.S. population, and public policy favoring immigration, it is
expected that the contribution of immigrants to future growth of the
population and labor force will increase;
13. The contribution of new immigrants to population and labor force
growth will be the highest in the South and West and in the largest
metropolitan areas, especially the "gateway" metropolitan areas.
The effects of these patterns and trends on Army recruiting can be mea-
sured both directly and indirectly. The direct effects are obvious: As the popu-
lation grows at differential rates across geographic areas, or migrates across
areas, recruiting markets shift accordingly. Also, population and migration
flows and changes in regional economic conditions tend to be highly corre-
lated, and mutually reinforcing. Individuals migrate in response to perceived
differentials in economic benefits and in turn create differential regional
growth patterns. All else equal, areas that expect to experience significant in-
migration will find the recruitable population growing. This effect, however,
may be offset by the strong employment conditions that normally characterize
areas of high in-migration.
A major issue that must be addressed is the sensitivity of recruiting to
population changes. A number of empirical studies have addressed this issue
and a recent survey (Goldberg, 1982) found that the estimated enlistment
elasticity varied from .13 to .65. This finding suggests that population
changes have a fairly small effect on enlistments. However, these elasticities
were obtained from national enlistment supply models, which represent the
average effect of population changes across regions. To predict the differential
effect of changes in population (and other factors), what is needed are sepa-
rate enlistment supply models for individual regions, such as recruiting
brigades or battalions. 24
Where, then, should recruiting resources be concentrated: In areas of
rapid growth and high in-migration, or in slow-growth or declining areas with
high out-migration? Obviously, recruitment will tend to be more difficult in
areas where the youth population is declining rapidly, regardless of the
reason for the decline. But ultimately it is an empirical issue as to which
areas provide the more fertile recruiting markets, and one that has not been
24Goldberg (1987) attempts to estimate a battalion-level forecasting model.
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addressed adequately in the manpower supply literature. While this litera-
ture has successfully estimated the supply impact of regional variation in
civilian pay and unemployment, neither the connection between these condi-
tions and migration, nor the direct effect of migration have been investi-
gated.26 This remains a task for future research.
The indirect effects of regional population shifts occur via the effects on
civilian labor markets. An important area in which these effects are not well
understood is how immigrants affect the critical youth labor market, and how
this effect varies across local areas. In particular, what needs to be investi-
gated is whether immigrants are substitutes for young adults in entry-level
jobs. The data reported in Section X showed that the flow of immigrants tends
to be concentrated regionally. Although previous research has found that the
economy-wide impact of immigration tends to be positive, it also indicates
that an increase in the number of immigrants depresses the average wage of
native workers by a small amount. Native workers' wages are reduced the
most in local labor markets in which immigrants are a significant share of the
labor force.
Further evidence supports the view that immigrants may be substitutes
for native youth. Immigrants typically are young adults, just beginning their
careers. They are also considerably younger than the native population: 22.6
percent are aged 15-24 versus just 15 percent of natives in this age group.
Empirical evidence, although meager, suggests what one would suspect from
this data: Immigration has a strong negative effect on youth wages, especially
minority youth, and a weak negative effect on youth employment. 26
25The only exceptions to this are two studies dealing with the Reserves (Mehay, 1990; 1991).
In the first, Mehay (1990) estimates a supply model for the U.S. Army Reserve and includes a
variable for the out-migration rate for each of over 900 U.S.A.R. market areas. The out-
migration variable was often found to be positively associated with enlistment rates. In the
second, Mehay (1991) produces evidence that the migration behavior of individual Reservists
tends to mirror that of civilians.
26Greenwood and McDowell (1986) survey the labor market consequences of immigration.
Few studies in the literature have examined the impact of undocumented aliens, who tend to
be even younger than legal immigrants and who are heavily concentrated in low-wage, low
skill entry level jobs for which native youth often compete. Thus, undocumented immigrants
may be closer subsitutes for native youth.
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Past federal policy has been an important determinant of how immi-
grants affect labor markets. Since 1965, policy has encouraged family reunifi-
cation. By 1987, less than four percent of immigrants were admitted to the
U.S. because of their skiDs or occupation. On balance it appears that in recent
decades the increased proportion of immigrants—both legal and illegal—who
are unskilled has increased the competition for entry level jobs with native
youth. This effect presumably drives down wages and makes military enlist-
ment a more attractive alternative for native youth.
Recently, Congress has come to agree with analysts who argue that the
U.S. admits the "wrong" immigrants (Borjas, 1990). Decision makers also
have become worried about the possibility that future shortages of skilled
workers will impede the nation's economic growth and harm our ability to
compete in global markets. These problems have prompted new legislation
that would increase the proportion of immigrants who possess significant
work skills. Such workers will not be as likely to compete with native youth
for low-skill, entry-level jobs. This should reduce the substitution for young
workers and raise youth wages, especially if future job shortages become
acute. Unfortunately, the military may become a less desirable option under
this set of circumstances. A complicating factor is at work, however. Policy
makers are also concerned about the aging of the U.S. work force and have
liberalized the immigration laws to admit a larger number of immigrants. An
increase in the total supply of immigrants will tend to offset the effect of
increasing the proportion who are skilled.
Immigration currently accounts for approximately 27 percent of U.S.
population growth, and is expected to account for an even greater share in the
future. Thus, it is important that manpower planners monitor trends in the
number of immigrants, their ages, skills and training, and the regional
distribution.
One final important point should not be overlooked: How the numerous
demographic and economic changes and projections detailed in this report are
likely to affect regional recruiting patterns depends not just on regional popu-
lation sizes and composition, but also on the qualifications and propensity of
that population. Table 40 shows that the estimated proportion of youth in
each region that would have qualified for military enlistment. These esti-
mated qualification rates are the lowest in the South and West. However,
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TABLE 40. ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH (Ages 18-23) QUALIFYING FOR
ENLISTMENT BY REGION AND BRANCH (1981)
Marine Air
Region Army Navy Corps Force
Northeast 81.4 72.4 64.8 66.9
Midwest 81.9 71.1 64.5 66.6
West 78.3 67.3 61.4 62.9
South 70.0 58.4 51.0 52.9
Total 77.3 66.6 61.5 59.6
Source: Mark J. Eitelberg, et al., "Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for
Military Entry." (Washington, DC: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, September
1984.)
these lower qualification rates in the past have been offset by higher military
propensity in those two regions. Table 41 shows the percentage of respon-
dents who indicated positive propensity for one or more of the military
services, termed the "composite active propensity on the Youth Attitude
Tracking Survey (YATS)." A respondent with a positive propensity is defined
as one who responds "definitely" or "probably" to the question of how likely
are they to be serving on active duty in one of the military branches. The
TABLE 41 . COMPOSITE ACTIVE PROPENSITY BY AGE AND REGION (percent)
Region
Age Northeast Midwest South West Total U.S.
16 38.1 39.5 44.6 42.0 41.5
17 31.3 31.8 41.1 36.9 35.8
18 24.5 26.9 33.1 26.9 28.4
19 23.4 23.5 29.2 21.4 25.1
20 17.3 16.2 25.9 18.9 20.2
21 17.1 13.8 22.3 19.9 18.7
Total 27.8 28.4 35.5 30.8 31.1
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.
77
propensity is calculated from a pooled sample of respondents from the annual
YATS surveys for the 1984-1988 period. The pooled data is necessary to
obtain sample sizes sufficiently large to provide reliable regional estimates.
As Table 41 reveals, the South has the highest positive propensity (35.5 per-
cent), followed by the West (30.8 percent), the Midwest (28.4 percent), and the
Northeast (27.8 percent).
Table 42 tabulates regional military propensity by aptitude. Low apti-
tude individuals are those who score in categories IIEB-V (percentiles 1-49)
on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, while high aptitude are those scoring in
categories I-IIIA (percentiles 50-99). The aptitude levels are predicted for
each region and propensity group. Table 42 shows that propensity is lower
among high-aptitude males, and higher among low-aptitude males. Among
high aptitude males, propensity is higher in the South and the West. It
appears that, in the South and West, overall military propensity and the
propensity among high aptitude individuals has compensated for the lower
qualification rates in those regions.
TABLE 42. COMPOSITE ACTIVE PROPENSITY BY APTITUDE AND REGION (percent)
Region



















aHigher aptitude is defined as the predicted probability of scoring in Categories l-IIIA
(percentiles (50-99) of the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Lower aptitude is defined as
predicted probability of scoring in Categories IIIB-V (percentiles 1-49).
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (1 991 ).
Table 43 provides information on regional enlistment propensities by
race and ethnicity. Nationwide, positive propensity is much higher for Blacks,
Hispanics and "others" (Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and
Alaskan Natives) than for whites. But the minority group with the highest
positive percentage varies across regions. In the Northwest, Hispanics have
78
the highest positive propensity (50.4 percent), followed by Blacks (47.5 per-
cent). In the South, Blacks have the highest propensity (57.2 percent). In the
West, the "other" category has the highest propensity (45.3 percent), followed
by Hispanics (42.4 percent).
TABLE 43. COMPOSITE ACTIVE PROPENSITY BY RACE/ETHNICITY
AND REGION (percent)
Region































Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (1 991 ).
That Hispanics have a high positive propensity in the West and South
has both positive and negative aspects for recruiting. On the negative side,
military qualification rates tend to be relatively low for Hispanics. On the
positive side, the growth rate of the Hispanic population is far outpacing that
of whites. Even if qualification rates remain the same, Hispanics in the West
and South will provide a large pool of potentially recruitable youth in the
early years of the 21st century.
Yet another factor must be considered, however. Due to slowing internal
migration and birth rates, it is predicted that much of the West's population
growth will consist of immigrants from abroad. A significant share of immi-
grants to the West have come from Central America, especially Mexico, and
many of these are undocumented. Immigrants from these nations historically
have had low skill and education levels. A significant portion do not possess
the educational backgrounds or language skills necessary for military
enlistment.
Concerns over future National "educational shortfalls" have been
expressed by numerous observers. The lack of preparation of minority groups
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is highlighted by differentials in unemployment rates. In 1988, the unem-
ployment rates for blacks and Hispanics aged 16-24 were 56 and 46 percent
greater than whites, respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1989). Also,
high school completion rates for blacks and Hispanics aged 18—19 are signifi-
cantly below those of white youths. To the extent that minority groups, prin-
cipally Hispanics, are unevenly distributed regionally, the qualified recruit-
able population will change more in some areas than in others. Future
recruiting policies may need to be tailored to address these issues, both at a
National and a regional level.
How will the trends identified in this report affect regional patterns of
Army recruiting in the 21st century? Quantifying the precise magnitude of
the various trends is a difficult, if not impossible, task. However, Table 44
presents a taxonomy of the likely direction of the effects of various trends and
projections. Entries with a question mark indicate either the trend has oppos-
ing effects and the net effect is unknown, or that no research has been
completed on the enlistment effect. Entries with a zero indicate the trend is
expected to have a minor effect.
TABLE 44. TAXONOMY OF THE EFFECT OF VARIOUS TRENDS ON
RECRUITING
Region
Trend Northeast Midwest South West
Distribution of Youth Population - - + +
Employment and Economic Growth + + - -
Net Migration Flows ? ? ? ?
Falling Migration Propensity + + + +
Distribution of New Immigrants + + +
APropensity ? ? + +
AQualifications ? ? - -
Source: Authors.
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Some of the trends have multiple effects and the magnitude of each is
not easily measured. For example, the flow of new immigrants is expected to
be greater in the South and West. If, as previous research indicates, immi-
grants are substitutes for native youth, the effect will be to boost enlistments.
On the other hand, immigrants who normally are not enlistment candidates
are expected to account for a growing share of new population growth. More-
over, immigrants in the South and West are often handicapped by language
problems. Table 44 attempts to weigh these opposing tendencies and provide
the most likely direction. It appears that, on balance, the trends discussed
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